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TANKS IN THE STREETS: SUVS, DESIGN DEFECTS, AND
ULTRAHAZARDOUS STRICT LIABILITY
KEVrN CASE*
INTRODUCTION
Sport Utility Vehicles, or "SUVs", are among the most dangerous
products ever placed in the hands of American consumers. 1 These vehicles
have been killing their drivers and passengers in rollover crashes for years.2
However, there is a growing awareness of the lethal injuries and catastro-
phic damage that SUVs cause to other vehicles and their occupants. 3 When
an SUV crashes into a passenger car, the occupants of the car are much
more likely to be killed than the occupants of the SUV. 4 This is due to the
particular design of SUVs. SUVs ride higher than cars, with bumpers and
frame rails that ride up over a car's frame in a collision, bypassing the car's
built-in energy-absorbing protections.5 SUVs also have stiffer frames than
passenger cars, allowing the SUV to transfer crash energy to the car instead
of sharing the energy equally.6 In addition, the sheer mass of SUVs, par-
ticularly the latest "behemoth" SUVs such as the Hummer and the new
* J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2006. The author wishes to thank Professor
Richard W. Wright for his invaluable guidance and insight, Shahid Haque for his thoughtful and de-
tailed comments and criticism, and Luke Shannon for his painstaking editing assistance.
1. See generally KEITH BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY: THE DANGEROUS RISE OF THE SUV
(2003) [hereinafter BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY]; Howard Latin & Bobby Kasolas, Bad Designs,
Lethal Profits: The Duty to Protect Other Motorists Against SUV Collision Risks, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 1161,
1161 (2002) [hereinafter Latin, Bad Designs] (concluding that SUVs "are probably the most dangerous
products (other than tobacco and alcohol) in widespread use in the United States").
2. U.S. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., CHARACTERISTICS OF FATAL ROLLOVER
CRASHES 1-2 (2002) [hereinafter NHTSA, ROLLOVER CRASHES].
3. Danny Hakim, A Regulator Takes Aim at Hazards of S.U. V. 's, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2002,
§ 3, at I [hereinafter Hakim, Regulator Takes Aim].
4. See U.S. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS VEHICLE
COMPATIBILITY 14-16 (2003) [hereinafter NHTSA, VEHICLE COMPATIBILITY].
5. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 85-87; Malcolm Gladwell, Big and Bad:
How the S.U. V. Ran Over Automotive Safety, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 12, 2004, at 28 [hereinafter
Gladwell, Big and Bad].
6. HAMPTON C. GABLER & WILLIAM T. HOLLOWELL, U.S. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., THE AGGRESSIVITY OF LIGHT TRUCKS AND VANS IN TRAFFIC CRASHES [hereinafter GABLER
& HOLLOWELL, AGGRESSIVITY], http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/departments/nrd-
I l/aggressivity/980908/980908.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2005).
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International CTX,7 will both knock a car backwards in an accident and
crush it.8 The effect is particularly gruesome in side impact crashes, where
an SUV overrides a car's door sill and thrusts directly into the passenger
compartment.9
SUVs are also lethal to pedestrians.' 0 Unlike a car, which will flip a
pedestrian up onto its relatively soft hood, an SUV will strike a pedestrian
at head or chest level, knocking her down and often running her over. I I
Children are especially at risk, since the massive front ends of SUVs and
their raised hoods will strike a child in the head upon impact. 12 SUVs also
kill children with more frequency when backing up, due to extensive "blind
spots" that limit the range of vision in the rear and side mirrors of SUVs. 13
One possible solution to these extraordinary risks would be to litigate
the dangerous features of SUVs as "design defects."' 14 Most litigation re-
garding SUVs has focused on rollovers, where the plaintiff is either the
driver or passenger of the SUV.15 Only one, unpublished decision has di-
rectly addressed the issue of SUV-car collisions. In De Veer v. Land Rover,
a Range Rover SUV smashed into the driver's side of the plaintiffs Saab,
leaving her with serious head injuries.' 6 She sued Land Rover, alleging that
her injuries were caused by the Range Rover's unreasonably dangerous
design. 17 However, the California appellate court upheld summary judg-
ment in favor of Land Rover. 18 The court held that Land Rover owed no
duty of care to the occupants of other vehicles, where the alleged defect did
7. Danny Hakim, New Way for Stars to Keep Truckin', N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, at B9 [herein-
after Hakim, Stars].
8. Crash Compatibility: How Vehicle Type, Weight Affect Outcomes, STATUS REPORT (Ins. Inst.
for Highway Safety, Arlington, Va.), Feb. 14, 1998, at 8 [hereinafter IIHS, Vehicle Weight].
9. Id. at 9.
10. MARC STARNES & ANDERS LONGTHORNE, U.S. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
CHILD PEDESTRIAN FATALITY RATES BY STRIKING VEHICLE BODY TYPE: A COMPARISON OF
PASSENGER CARS, SPORT UTILITY VEHICLES, PICKUPS, AND VANS 3 (2003) [hereinafter NHTSA,
CHILD PEDESTRIAN], available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/Rnotes/2003/809-
640/RNPedFatal.pdf.
11. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 233.
12. Id.; NHTSA, CHILD PEDESTRIAN, supra note 10, at 3.
13. Paul Hampel, Vehicles'Blind Spots Contribute to Child Fatalities, Group Says, CHI. TRIBUNE,
Jan. 25, 2004, § 12, at I [hereinafter Hampel, Blind Spots].
14. See generally Latin, Bad Designs, supra note 1.
15. See, e.g., Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663 (6th. Cir. 2000); Ford Motor Co. v. Ammer-
man, 705 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
16. De Veer v. Land Rover N. Am., Inc., No. B141538, 2001 WL 34354946, *1 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 14, 2001).
17. Id. at * 1.
18. Id.
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not cause the initial collision, but merely enhanced the damage and injury
resulting from the collision. 19
De Veer illustrates one hurdle that the occupant of a vehicle struck by
an SUV might have to overcome before reaching any determination of the
reasonableness of SUV design. The plaintiff would have to convince a
court to merge two doctrines: the enhanced injury, or "crashworthiness"
doctrine, and the doctrine of liability to bystanders or other non-users of a
product.20 Under the enhanced injury doctrine, a manufacturer is liable to
the user of a product for enhanced injuries resulting from a design defect,
even if that defect was not the cause of the initial accident.21 Under the
bystander liability doctrine, a manufacturer may be liable to non-users of a
product for injury caused by a design defect. 22 In an SUV-car collision,
therefore, a court must agree that an SUV manufacturer owes a duty to
occupants of other vehicles-not just occupants of the SUV-for injuries
that are enhanced by the design of the SUV, even when that design was not
the initial cause of the collision.
Although the De Veer court was unwilling to extend the enhanced in-
jury rule to non-users, other courts have not hesitated to do so. In context of
car-motorcycle collisions, two federal circuit courts of appeal in the 1970s
held automobile manufacturers liable for enhanced injuries, even though
the cars' defective designs did not cause the accidents. 23 Thus, there is
precedent in similar if not identical contexts for allowing SUV collision
victims to sue an SUV manufacturer. Perhaps realizing this, SUV manufac-
turers have begun settling crash compatibility suits, some for millions of
dollars. 24
Once the plaintiff establishes that the SUV manufacturer owes her a
duty, the next step in the design defect approach would be a risk-utility
analysis of the allegedly defective design. 25 Such an analysis would bal-
ance SUV risks against the utility or benefits of SUV design, in light of
alternative design possibilities. 26 The utility of SUVs is marginal at best.
Many consumers buy SUVs because they believe that SUVs are safer than
19. Id. at* 5.
20. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965) (bystander liability); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 16 (1998) (enhanced injury rule).
21. See Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 497 (8th Cir. 1968).
22. See Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1969).
23. See Passwaters v. Gen. Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972) (applying Iowa law);
Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
24. Danny Hakim & Norm Alster, Lawsuits: This Year's Model, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2004, at Cl
[hereinafter Hakim & Alster, Lawsuits].
25. See Latin, Bad Designs, supra note 1, at 1184-85.
26. Id.
20061
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cars. 27 However, the opposite is true: SUV occupants are more likely to die
in their vehicle than car occupants, due to rollover dangers and increased
injuries when hitting fixed objects. 28 Likewise, any alleged benefits from
the "off-road" capabilities of SUVs are of little consequence because few
SUV owners ever take their vehicles off-road.29 Almost all SUV drivers
use their SUV in the same way they would use a car.30 Nor does an SUV's
extra space offer any real benefit to large families because the same amount
of space, if not more, is available in a much safer minivan.31 In reality,
SUV ownership offers nothing more than a feeling of power, control, pro-
tection, freedom, and intimidation of others. 32 The feeling is purely per-
sonal to the driver. Weighed against the substantial risks SUVs create to
others, this utility is negligible.
A second approach to challenging the dangers of SUV design would
be to allege that driving a large SUV is an ultrahazardous or abnormally
dangerous activity, subject to strict liability for any injuries caused to non-
occupants. 33 The doctrine of ultrahazardous strict liability, 34 while widely
accepted, has been primarily limited to a narrow range of activities, such as
blasting operations and toxic waste storage.35 The doctrine has not been
expanded to include automobiles, despite the significant risk of serious
injury to others from a driver's loss of control, because both Restatements
of Torts (First and Second) have excluded the doctrine's application to
activities of "common usage."' 36 However, courts have not always agreed
with the Restatements; in fact, some courts have explicitly or implicitly
rejected Restatement constraints when imposing strict liability for ultrahaz-
27. John Cloud, Why the SUV is All the Rage, TIME, Feb. 24, 2003, at 34, 36 [hereinafter Cloud,
SUV Rage].
28. See U.S. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 2003 ANNUAL ASSESSMENT: MOTOR
VEHICLE TRAFFIC CRASH FATALITY COUNTS AND INJURY ESTIMATES FOR 2003, at 49 (2003) [hereinaf-
ter NHTSA, 2003 ASSESSMENT], available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-
30/NCSA/PPT/2003AARelease.pdf; see also BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 169.
29. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 113.
30. Id.
31. Peter J. Cooper, Attack of the Four- Wheeled Giants, USA TODAY, Mar. 2004, at 66, 68 [here-
inafter Cooper, Attack].
32. See BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 95-108; Keith Bradsher, Domination,
Submission and the Chevy Suburban, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1997, § 4, at 2 [hereinafter Bradsher, Domi-
nation].
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519-20 (1977).
34. The Restatement (First) refers to "ultrahazardous" activity, see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS § 519 (1938), while the Restatement (Second) uses the term "abnormally dangerous," see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519-20 (1977). For purposes of this Note, the terms will be used
interchangeably, unless otherwise noted.
35. See Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 160 (N.J. 1983) (toxic waste);
Asheville Const. Co. v. S. Ry. Co., 19 F.2d 32, 34 (4th Cir. 1927) (blasting).
36. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520(b) (1938); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 520 cmt. i (1977).
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ardous activities. 37 Rather than applying a strict legal test, these courts have
chosen to adhere to the basic principles underlying the doctrine. In particu-
lar, two broad themes emerge: first, a recognition of the extraordinary in-
herent risks of certain activities; and second, an overarching concern of
fairness to innocent victims injured as a result of those activities. 38 More-
over, the "common usage" of SUVs should not be taken for granted. The
Restatement (Second), after stating that cars are too common to be subject
to strict liability, adds, "On the other hand, the operation of a tank or any
other motor vehicle of such size and weight as to be unusually difficult to
control safely ... may be abnormally dangerous. ' 39 Today's SUVs, with
their massive size, weight, rollover tendencies, and in the case of the
Hummer, military origin,40 fit this description alarmingly well.
This Note will explore two legal arguments, introduced above, that
can be made by nonoccupant plaintiffs who are injured as a result of the
dangerous features of SUVs. Part I will describe the extraordinary risks
posed by SUVs to their own occupants, occupants of other vehicles, and
pedestrians. Part II will discuss the possibility of litigating SUV design as a
design defect, concluding first that SUV manufacturers indeed owe a duty
of care to non-users of their products for enhanced injuries caused by their
vehicles, and second that SUVs fail the risk-utility analysis that is central to
a determination of design reasonableness. Part III will discuss whether
driving an SUV, especially a "behemoth" SUV like a Hummer, can be
considered an ultrahazardous activity. Part III concludes that SUVs can be
deemed ultrahazardous under both the Restatement factors and the ap-
proach of courts that adhere to traditional principles of ultrahazardous strict
liability.
I. THE EXTRAORDINARY DANGERS OF SUVS
Light trucks (LTVs)-a category that includes SUVs, pickups, and
minivans-have become increasingly popular in the United States.4 1 In
37. See, e.g., Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255, 1261-63 (Or. 1982) (rejecting "value to the commu-
nity" and "appropriateness of location" factors); Yukon Equip. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d
1206, 1211 (Alaska 1978) ("[W]e do not believe the Restatement (Second) approach should be used.");
Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1186-87 (Wash. 1972) (giving little or no weight to factors of
"common usage," "appropriateness to the location," or "value to the community").
38. See Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931).
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i (1977) (emphasis added).
40. See BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note I, at 363-64.
41. In 2003, there were roughly 79 million LTVs registered in the U.S., comprising 36 % of all
registered passenger vehicles. See Jeffrey W. Runge, M.D., Adm'r., U.S. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., Before The Committee On Commerce, Science, And Transportation, United States Senate,
(Feb. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Runge, Statement], available at
2006]
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fact, LTV sales now far outpace sales of passenger cars. 42 This popularity
is driven by SUVs, which comprise the bulk of LTV sales. 43
The rise of the SUV has come at the expense of sales of passenger
cars. In 1975, cars accounted for 71.2% of all passenger vehicles sold in the
U.S.; by 2004, that figure was down to 47.9%.44 SUVs, on the other hand,
had only a 1.8% market share in 1975; by 2004, however, SUVs accounted
for 26.1% of all passenger vehicles sold.45 The most explosive growth has
occurred in large SUVs, defined as those with a wheelbase of over 110
inches. 46 Since 1987, the market share for small SUVs has actually de-
clined, while the market share for large SUVs has increased by 28 times.47
Despite safety concerns and rising fuel costs, SUVs continue to sell
strongly.48
http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/DOT/NHTSANHTSA%2OAdministration/Presentations%20&%2
OSpeeches/Associated%2OFiles/Runge2003Feb26.pdf.
42. U.S. Automobile and Truck Retail Sales: 1970-2004,
http://www.senate.michigan.gov/sfa/Economics/RetailAutoSales.PDF (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). LTV
sales overtook passenger car sales for the first time in 2001 (8,696,200 to 8,422,100). Id. By 2004,
LTVs outsold cars 9,360,000 to 7,504,500. Id.
43. In 2004, SUVs accounted for 26.1% of all passenger vehicles sold, while pickups accounted
for 15.2%, vans for 7%, and wagons for 3.7%. OFFICE OF TRANSP. AND AIR QUALITY, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, EPA 420-R-04-001, LIGHT-DUTY AUTOMOTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND FUEL ECONOMY
TRENDS: 1975 THROUGH 2004, at 36-40 (2004) [hereinafter EPA, TRENDS]. Sales of non-SUV LTVs
such as pickups and vans remained fairly constant from 1975 until 2004, but the market share for SUVs
has increased dramatically, up from 1.8% in 1975. Id.
44. Id. at 37.
45. Id. Just from 2002 to 2003, SUV registrations increased by 12%, compared to a .9% increase
in car registrations. NHTSA, 2003 ASSESSMENT, supra note 28, at 53.
46. EPA, TRENDS, supra note 43, app. A, at A-12.
47. Large SUVs had an 0.1% market share in 1975, 0.4% in 1987, and 11.1% in 2004. Id. at 37.
48. In the first seven months of 2004, despite well-publicized safety concerns, SUVs accounted
for 27.2% of passenger vehicle sales, up from 26% in the same period in 2003. Danny Hakim, Safety
Gap Grows Wider Between S. U. V 's and Cars, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2004, at C1 [hereinafter Hakim,
Safety Gap]. SUV sales hit a plateau in the first four months of 2005, however, down 1.7% from 2004
levels. Danny Hakim, A Love Affair with S.U.V. 's Begins to Cool, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2005, at A1.
The recent decline may be the result of higher gas prices. Id. Executives at General Motors, however,
insist that sales slowed because many large SUVs are nearing the end of their product cycles. Id. To
kick-start sales, G.M. plans to introduce redesigned versions of large SUVs such as the Cadillac Esca-
lade and Chevy Suburban in 2006. Id.
Further weakening the argument that gas prices are to blame, sales of full-size pickups-
which consume as much fuel as SUVs-grew sharply in 2004. Danny Hakim, Big Pickup Trucks
Eclipsing S.U.V. 's, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at CI [hereinafter Hakim, Eclipsing]. The line between
large SUVs and pickups is blurring, as "American buyers seem to want their big pickups bigger and
more S.U.V.-like." Id.
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A. The Basics of SUV Design
SUVs are designed quite differently than cars.49 Cars have to be light
enough to meet fuel-efficiency standards, yet safe enough to meet safety
standards. 50 As such, cars utilize an expensive and elaborately engineered
form of construction called "unit body," in which the underbody, sides and
roof form a single structure. 5 1 This provides built-in "crumple zones" that
absorb energy in a crash. 52 SUVs, which are exempt from fuel efficiency
regulations, use a simpler, cheaper, and heavier design called "body-on-
frame."'53 The frame consists of two steel rails running the length of the
SUV, connected to one another with welded crossbeams to form a kind of
ladder; the rest of the vehicle is then bolted on.54 The result is a stiffer un-
derbody that fails to crumple in a crash.5 5 In fact, the stiffness of an SUV is
twice that of a passenger car.56
Of course, SUVs also weigh a good deal more than cars, and the dis-
parity is growing. 5 7 Between 1990 and 2001, driven by the proliferation of
SUVs, the average weight difference between LTVs and cars increased
from 830 lbs. to 1130 lbs. 58 SUVs are also much taller than the average car,
with more ground clearance, higher roofs, and higher hoods. While cars are
required by federal regulation to keep their bumpers between 16 and 20
inches off the ground, SUVs are exempt from such requirements because
the federal government classifies SUVs as light trucks.59
49. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 85-87; see also Gladwell, Big and Bad,
supra note 5, at 28; Michelle J. White, The "Arms Race" on American Roads: The Effect of Sport
Utility Vehicles and Pickup Trucks on Traffic Safety, 47 J.L. & ECON. 333, 333-34 (2004) [hereinafter
White, Arms Race].
50. Gladwell, Big and Bad, supra note 5, at 28.
51. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 85; Gladwell, Big and Bad, supra note 5, at
28.
52. Gladwell, Big and Bad, supra note 5, at 28; White, Arms Race, supra note 49, at 334.
53. Gladwell, Big and Bad, supra note 5, at 28; BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at
85.
54. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 85-86.
55. Id. at 87; White, Arms Race, supra note 49, at 334.
56. Runge, Statement, supra note 41.
57. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 145 (noting that "SUVs typically outweigh
cars and minivans by at least a quarter-ton and sometimes as much as a full ton").
58. Runge, Statement, supra note 41.
59. See 49 C.F.R. § 581.1-.3 (2004) (applying bumper standard to passenger vehicles only); 49
C.F.R. § 523.5 (2004) (defining "light trucks" as opposed to "passenger vehicles"); see also Huge Cost
of Bumper MiSmatch, STATUS REPORT (Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety, Arlington, Va.), Sep, 13, 2004, at
5.
2006]
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B. The Dangers SUVs Pose to Their Occupants
Most Americans believe that SUVs are safer than cars. 60 However, re-
search has shown this to be nothing but a myth. 61 Rather, the opposite is
true: statistics suggest that SUVs are actually deadlier to their occupants
than cars. 62 In 2003, for instance, drivers and passengers in an SUV were
nearly 11% more likely to die in an accident than drivers or passengers in a
car. 63 Children are particularly at risk. More and more children ride in
SUVs; in fact, SUVs are now the second-most common way of transport-
ing children, behind minivans. 64 However, a child riding in an SUV is
twice as likely to die as a child riding in a minivan.65
The principal threat to SUV occupants comes from an SUV's ten-
dency to rollover.66 Despite widespread media attention and litigation over
rollover problems, SUV rollover fatalities more than doubled from 1991 to
2000.67 SUVs roll over nearly three times as often as passenger cars, 68 and
more than pickups as well. 69
60. Cloud, SUV Rage, supra note 27, at 36; Myron Levin, Study Questions Safety of SUVs, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2003, at C1 [hereinafter Levin, Study Questions Safety]; Joan Claybrook, President,
Pub. Citizen, Former Admn'r, Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Testimony before the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation: Profit-Driven Myths and Severe Public Dam-
age: The Terrible Truth About SUVs 3 (Feb. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Claybrook, Testimony], available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/JC-SUV-testimony.pdf.
61. A detailed study of SUVs and cars over five model years concluded that SUVs are not safer
for their drivers, even without taking into account the risks SUVs pose to others on the roads. See
MARC ROSS & TOM WENZEL, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, REPORT NO. T021, AN ANALYSIS OF TRAFFIC
DEATHS BY VEHICLE TYPE AND MODEL 3-6 (2002) [hereinafter ROSS AND WENZEL, ANALYSIS],
available at http://www.aceee.org/pubs/t021 full.pdf.
Even subcompacts such as the Volkswagen Jetta and the Honda Civic were found to be as safe
for their drivers as the average SUV. Id. at 5; Levin, Study Questions Safety, supra note 60 (discussing
the Ross and Wenzel study); Claybrook, Testimony, supra note 60, at 3.
62. From 2002 to 2003, while the overall fatality rate for occupants of passenger vehicles declined
by nearly 3%, the fatality rate for SUV occupants increased by 10%. NHTSA, 2003 ASSESSMENT,
supra note 28, at 49. Other than SUVs, every other passenger vehicle category registered a decline: a
5.4% decrease in the fatality rate for cars, a 2% decrease for vans, and a 3.2% decrease for pickup
trucks. Id. From 2003 to 2004, fatalities declined 2.4% in passenger cars while increasing 4.9% in
SUVs. U.S. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 2004 PROJECTIONS: MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC
CRASH FATALITIES AND INJURIES 16 (2005) [hereinafter NHTSA, 2004 PROJECTIONS], available at
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/PPT/2004EARclease.pdf.
63. Hakim, Safety Gap, supra note 48.
64. PUBLIC CITIZEN, SUVs: THE HIGH COSTS OF LAX FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS FOR
AMERICAN FAMILIES 10 (2003) [hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN, HIGH COSTS], available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/costs_of suvs.pdf.
65. Id. at 10, 14-15.
66. Hakim, Safety Gap, supra note 48. Rollovers accounted for 59% of SUV fatalities in 2003,
and 61% in 2002. NHTSA, 2003 ASSESSMENT, supra note 28, at 89.
67. NHTSA, ROLLOVER CRASHES, supra note 2, at 2, 6.
68. Runge, Statement, supra note 41.
69. From 2002 to 2003, rollover fatalities in SUVs increased by 6.8%, while rollover fatalities in
pickups declined by 6.8%, and in cars declined by 7.5%. NHTSA, 2003 ASSESSMENT, supra note 28, at
[Vol 81:149
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Another risk to SUV occupants arises when an SUV crashes into a
fixed object, such as a retaining wall, telephone pole, or other roadside
hazard. Because of the SUV's stiff frames and lack of crumple zones, the
force of the impact is transmitted directly to the SUV's occupants. 70 For
example, if the driver of a 2002 Cadillac Escalade--one of the largest
SUVs on the market-crashed into an unyielding surface at thirty-five
miles an hour, he would have a 16% chance of sustaining a life-threatening
head injury and a 20% chance of receiving a life-threatening chest injury. 71
That same driver in a Ford Windstar-a large minivan with a similar seat-
ing capacity to the Escalade-would have only a 2% chance of a life-
threatening head injury, and only a 4% chance of a life-threatening chest
injury. 72 Thus, the driver of the Escalade would be five to eight times more
likely to die when hitting a fixed object at a moderate speed than the driver
of the minivan.
C. The Dangers SUVs Pose to Others
Some of the same design characteristics of SUVs that make them such
a danger to their occupants, namely their extra height and frame design,
become particularly lethal in collisions with other vehicles. 73 This issue is
beginning to gain more attention. The National Highway and Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) recently warned of the "large and growing" prob-
lem of fatalities in collisions between LTVs and cars. 74 In fact, Dr. Jeffery
Runge, the administrator of the NHTSA, recently informed Congress of the
frightening statistic that in two-vehicle fatal collisions involving LTVs and
passenger cars, 80% of the fatalities were to the occupants of the passenger
cars.
75
83. From 2003 to 2004, rollover fatalities declined 3.1% in cars and 2.6% in pickups; SUV rollover
deaths increased by 6.9%. NHTSA, 2004 PROJECTIONS, supra note 62, at 18.
70. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note I, at 169.
71. Id. at 144.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 169.
74. NHTSA, VEHICLE COMPATIBILITY, supra note 4, at 16. In addition, the Insurance Institute for
Highway Safety has issued several special reports in recent years to address the issue of SUV-car
collisions. See, e.g., In Collisions with Cars, SUVs are Incompatible. Are SUVs That Are Bigger and
Heavier Posing Even More Risks?, STATUS REPORT (Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety, Arlington, Va.),
Apr. 28, 2005.
75. Runge, Statement, supra note 41. At first glance, statistics like those stated by Dr. Runge-
showing that SUV occupants are much less likely to die in collisions with cars-might appear to con-
tradict the discussion in the previous section which noted that SUVs are more dangerous to their occu-
pants than cars. See Hakim, Safety Gap, supra note 48 (reporting that SUV occupants were nearly 11%
more likely to die than car occupants in 2003). The greater danger to SUV occupants, however, does
not result from collisions with other vehicles; rather, as discussed, SUVs injure and kill their occupants
in rollovers and collisions with fixed objects. See supra notes 61-72 and accompanying text. Thus, far
2006]
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
The statistics are indeed alarming. In 2003, crashes between a car and
an LTV resulted in a death rate for the occupants of the car more than four
times that of the occupants of the LTV. 76 These numbers increase exponen-
tially when an LTV strikes a car broadside. Statistics show that when LTVs
struck passenger cars in the side in 2003, twenty-four times more occupants
of the cars perished than occupants of the LTVs. 77 In contrast, when cars
hit LTVs in the side, the ratio was more or less even.78
Isolating SUVs from other LTVs such as vans and pickup trucks illus-
trates their inherent danger. A composite of fatality data from 1995 to 2001
shows that head-on collisions between a car and an SUV killed 4.5 drivers
in the car for every one driver in the SUV.79 SUVs ramming into the sides
of cars killed twenty-two car drivers for every one in the SUV.80 Car-to-car
broadside deaths were substantially lower, with a ratio of 8.2 to 1.81
The threat posed by large SUVs is even greater. In fact, the NHTSA
has concluded that large SUVs are more dangerous in side-impact crashes
than both full-size vans and full-size pickup trucks. 82 A study by the Insur-
ance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) in 1998 found that when a large
SUV-defined as one weighing more than 4,000 lbs.-strikes the side of a
car, regardless of the car's weight, the car's occupant is 48 times more
likely to die than the driver of the SUV.83 The years since that study have
seen the proliferation of even larger "behemoth" SUVs such as the Hum-
mer H1 (7,847 lbs. curb weight), the Ford Excursion (6,734 lbs.), 84 and the
new International CTX (14,500 lbs.). 85
from being inconsistent, the statistics actually highlight the lethality of SUVs to their own occupants,
for if SUV occupants survive more crashes with ears yet continue to die at a higher rate, then the roll-
over problem must indeed be quite severe.
76. The exact numbers were 4,481 fatalities in the LTVs, to 1,098 in the cars. NHTSA, 2003
ASSESSMENT, supra note 28, at 96.
77. Id. at 98.
78. NHTSA, VEHICLE COMPATIBILITY, supra note 4, at 14.
79. Id. at 15.
80. Id. at 16.
81. Id.
82. STEPHEN M. SUMMERS ET AL., U.S. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PAPER #307,
NHTSA'S RESEARCH PROGRAM FOR VEHICLE COMPATIBILITY 3 [hereinafter NHTSA, RESEARCH
PROGRAM], available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd- I1 l8ESV-000307.pdf (last visited Sep.
17, 2005).
83. IIHS, Vehicle weight, supra note 8, at 10.
84. See Edmunds.com, http://www.edmunds.com (last visited Sep. 17, 2005) (vehicle curb
weights for model years 2005 and 2006). By way of comparison, the 2005 Honda Civic has a curb
weight of 2,598 lbs. Id.
85. See International CTX Product Specifications, http://www.internationaldelivers.com/assets/
pdf/CXTdetail.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2005). Introduced in September 2004, the CTS is a giant
SUV/pickup hybrid which International calls an "extreme truck." Hakim, Stars, supra note 7. At over
seven tons, it weights more than twice as much as a Hummer H2. Id. Based on initial sales success,
International plans to introduce two more "Godzilla-size" models in 2005. Id. Nine feet tall, the CTX
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The reasons for the huge disparity in SUV and car fatalities are crash
compatibility and aggressivity. 86 Compatibility involves how vehicles
physically match up with each other in the event of a collision. 87 Aggres-
sivity measures the potential of one vehicle to inflict damage on another.88
A vehicle's aggressivity is measured by comparing the number of crashes a
vehicle is involved in with the number of driver fatalities occurring in the
other vehicle. 89 A vehicle that is not physically compatible with other vehi-
cles will have greater aggressivity.90
SUVs are incompatible with passenger cars in three ways: weight,
stiffness, and height.91 SUVs, of course, tend to be the heaviest class of
vehicles on the road, often outweighing cars by a ton or more.92 Lighter
vehicles are at a fundamental disadvantage when the vehicles they collide
with are heavier 93 because the heavier vehicle transfers the violence of the
impact to the lighter vehicle.94 In a head-on collision, the heavier vehicle
knocks the lighter one backwards, resulting in greater injury to the occu-
pants of the lighter vehicle than if they had hit an immovable barrier at the
same speed. 95
Weight disparities among vehicles are not new; smaller cars have al-
ways shared the roads with larger ones. However, more than mere weight
discrepancy is involved here. Even when compared to cars of similar
weights, LTVs are more than twice as likely to cause a fatality when strik-
ing a car.96 This is due to the second major incompatibility of SUV design:
stiffness. 97 The rigid frame-rail designs employed in the construction of
SUVs make them twice as stiff as passenger cars, which have softer "unit
body" construction.98 In a collision between vehicles-even of the same
weight-the stiffer vehicle transfers most of the crash energy to the less-
stiff collision partner.99 The NHTSA has found a direct correlation between
rides at the height of an eighteen-wheeler; however, the CTX does not require a commercial operator's
license. Id.
86. Hakim, Regulator Takes Aim, supra note 3.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. NHTSA, RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 82, at 2.
90. GABLER & HOLLOWELL, AGGRESSIVITY, supra note 6.
91. Id.
92. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 170.
93. GABLER & HOLLOWELL, AGGRESSIVITY, supra note 6.
94. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 170.
95. IIHS, Vehicle Weight, supra note 8, at 8.
96. Runge, Statement, supra note 41.
97. GABLER & HOLLOWELL, AGGRESSIVITY, supra note 6.
98. Id.; see supra notes 49-59 and accompanying text.
99. White, Arms Race, supra note 49, at 334. In one experiment, researchers tested a Ford Ranger
pickup, upon whose frame the Explorer SUV is based, in a collision with a Taurus. The weight of the
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vehicle stiffness and fatalities in cars. 100 When stiffness incompatibility is
combined with the huge weight disparity between SUVs and cars, the result
is that the cars get crushed and knocked backward at the same time.101
However, the deadliest incompatibility is the height differential. Ide-
ally, the bumpers and frame structures of two vehicles should more or less
line up in a collision, absorbing as much of the impact energy as possible,
and transferring less of that energy to the vehicles' occupants. 102 But SUVs
ride higher than cars, allowing the SUV to bypass the car's crumple zones
and energy-absorbing structural features.103 SUV bumpers are exempt from
the height requirements of cars, and they are usually mounted much higher.
Even more problematic are the SUV's high frame rails, which override the
car's frame or miss it altogether. 104 The result in a front-end collision is
that the stiff front end of the SUV soars over the car's crumple zone and
plows up to the base of the windshield, often shoving the contents of the
car's engine compartment through the chests of the car's driver and front-
seat passenger. 105 An even more gruesome result occurs when an SUV
broadsides a car. The SUV's stiff front end bypasses the rigid sill area at
the base of the car's door, instead going right through the much softer
door. 106 Failing to engage any energy-absorbing feature of the car, the full
force of the SUV rams into the car's passenger compartment, striking the
occupants with little or no dilution of the crash forces. 107 To make matters
worse, many of the most popular SUVs, such as the Ford Explorer, were
designed with frame rails that actually curved upwards at the front. 108 In a
side impact, these upward curving frame rails can pierce a car's passenger
compartment and effectively spear its occupants. 109 Finally, in side impact
collisions, the extra hood height of an SUV makes it more likely to strike a
car occupant in the head. I 10
vehicles was about the same, but the Taurus suffered significantly more damage. GABLER &
HOLLOWELL, AGGRESSIVITY, supra note 6.
100. NHTSA, VEHICLE COMPATIBILITY, supra note 4, at 17-18.
101. IIHS, Vehicle Weight, supra note 8, at 8.
102. Id. at 8-9.
103. GABLER & HOLLOWELL, AGGRESSIVITY, supra note 6.
104. Runge, Statement, supra note 41.
105. Latin, Bad Designs, supra note 1, at 1201-02.
106. IIHS, Vehicle Weight, supra note 8, at 9.
107. GABLER & HOLLOWELL, AGGRESSIVITY, supra note 6.
108. Keith Bradsher, Changes in Ford Explorer Aim at Protecting Other Motorists, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2000, at CI [hereinafter Bradsher, Changes].
109. Id.
110. Putting the Crash Compatibility Issue in Perspective, STATUS REPORT (Ins. Inst. for Highway
Safety, Arlington, Va.), Oct. 30, 1999, at 10.
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In addition to those killed by SUVs in cars, there is growing aware-
ness of the dangers that SUVs pose to pedestrians, particularly children. A
recent NHTSA research report, studying data from 1997 to 2001, found
that SUVs, along with pickups and vans, fatally injured pedestrians at a
higher rate than passenger cars.Ill The greatest difference was seen among
children under eight years old.' 12 At first glance, it seems obvious that a
Hummer will injure a pedestrian more than a Geo Metro will, just as a
Mack truck will probably cause more severe injuries than a Hummer.
However, researchers have found that the severity of pedestrian injuries
was not linked to the SUV's greater weight; after all, even a small car is a
heavy object when compared to a pedestrian.' 13 Rather, the exacerbated
injuries were once again a result of vehicle stiffness and front end de-
sign.114 When a pedestrian is struck by a car, she will likely be flipped over
onto the soft hood of the car, often causing severe leg injuries but sparing a
life-threatening injury to her head or chest. 115 An SUV's greater height and
boxy front end design, on the other hand, will guarantee that the force of
the full mass of the vehicle will slam into her head or chest. If that fails to
kill her, it will nonetheless knock her down, and the SUV will then run
over her. If she were hit by a car instead, she would be flipped onto the soft
hood and then roll off. 116
It is not hard to see why children are most at risk from the front end
design of SUVs. The hood of the Hummer H2 stands fifty-one inches off
the ground. 1 7 This is roughly the level of a child's head. Even at a low
speed, a child struck by a Hummer would stand little chance of survival.
Furthermore, the NHTSA has found that drivers of higher elevated vehicles
with a larger frontal configuration, such as the Hummer and other large
SUVs, are more likely to have their view of smaller pedestrians ob-
structed. 1 8 Of course, no Hummer driver wants to kill a child; however, if
the driver cannot see the child, no amount of carefulness is going to help.
This is exacerbated by the fact that-unlike other large vehicles like tractor
Il1. NHTSA, CHILD PEDESTRIAN, supra note 10, at 3. There are of yet no statistics which break
out SUVs from vans and pickups in this regard. However, vans often have oversized side mirrors, and
are usually used in commercial activities, not in the family driveway.
112. Id.
113. DEVON E. LEFLER & HAMPTON C. GABLER, SEVENTEENTH INT'L CONFERENCE ON ENHANCED
SAFETY OF VEHICLES, THE EMERGING THREAT OF LIGHT TRUCK IMPACTS WITH PEDESTRIANS 5
(2001), http://www.me.vt.edu/gabler/publications/esvped-paper2l2.pdf.
114. Id.
115. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 233; see also White, Arms Race, supra note
49, at 334.
116. White, Arms Race, supra note 49, at 334.
117. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 400.
118. NHTSA, CHILD PEDESTRIAN, supra note 10, at 3.
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trailers and commercial vans-SUVs are commonly driven in residential
neighborhoods, where most accidents involving children occur.
The long "blind spots" inherent in SUV design are also a factor in the
increasing problem of children being run over by vehicles that are backing
up. 119 SUVs often have blind spots that extend twenty-two to thirty-eight
feet behind the vehicle. 120 A recent NHTSA study of death certificates has
found that "backing up" deaths particularly affect children under five years
old, and that these deaths tend to involve SUVs.121
The massive size of SUVs can block the vision of other drivers as
well. One simply cannot see around these vehicles. 122 In addition, many
SUV windows are either set higher than car windows, or are tinted so that
one cannot see through them. 123 The NHTSA has recognized that the
blocked vision of car and motorcycle drivers, due to the higher profile of
SUVs and other LTVs, is a serious obstacle to crash avoidance. 124
Another crash avoidance problem is the glare from an SUV's higher
mounted headlamps. 125 A study by the Society of Automotive Engineers
(SAE) recently found that headlight glare rises as much as 1000% when the
headlight is mounted at the height of a driver's eyes or side mirror. 126 An
SUV can thus temporarily blind drivers coming the other way and drivers
ahead of it in traffic.
Taken separately, the glare and visibility problems would be annoying
and dangerous, but could probably be ameliorated somewhat with new
technology and better federal regulations regarding headlight and window
placement. But taken together with the rate at which SUVs kill other driv-
ers and pedestrians, a picture emerges of a product that poses such dangers
to society that it is a wonder it is allowed on the roads at all.
119. Hampel, Blind Spots, supra note 13.
120. Id.
121. See U.S. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DATA COLLECTION STUDY: DEATHS
AND INJURIES RESULTING FROM CERTAIN NON-TRAFFIC AND NON-CRASH EVENTS app. V, at 58
(2004), http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/problems/studies/NonTraffic-NonCrash/lmages/noncrash.pdf.
122. See BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 226 (noting the "imposing wall of sheet
metal and tinted glass" presented by a big SUV).
123. Id.
124. U.S. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NHTSA VEHICLE SAFETY RULEMAKING
PRIORITIES AND SUPPORTING RESEARCH: CALENDAR YEARS 2003-2006,
http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/rulings/PriorityPlan/FinalVeh/Index.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2005).
125. Id.
126. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 228. The Hummer H2, for example, carries
its headlights 43.5 inches off the ground. Id.
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D. Industry, Regulatory, and Insurance Reaction to SUV Dangers
In the face of such overwhelming statistical evidence, auto manufac-
turers insist that SUVs are safe. 127 General Motors recently stated that
SUVs "are among the safest vehicles on the road and have contributed to
the substantial decline in the nation's fatality rate."'12 8 However, the indus-
try's actions belie its words. 129 In 2000, as the problem of crash compatibil-
ity became increasingly publicized, Ford made several changes to its SUV
lineup.130 The upward curving frame rails on the mid-sized Explorer SUV
were inverted, now curving downwards so as to meet the frame of a Ford
Taurus mid-sized sedan. 13 1 However, the Explorer gained 200 extra
pounds. 132 For its immense Excursion SUV, which has very high frame
rails, Ford opted to install a "blocker bar" underneath the frame rather than
lower the rails. 133 The blocker bar is an energy-absorbing steel bar just
behind the bumper, designed to engage the frame of a lower vehicle upon
impact. 134
In December 2003, a consortium of automakers agreed on a voluntary
effort to make SUVs more crash-compatible with cars. 135 Fifteen auto-
makers from four nations agreed to redesign their light trucks-specifically
SUVs and pickups-to make the frame rails and other front-end, crash-
absorbing devices overlap with at least half of the similar area on passenger
cars. 136 The pact is strictly voluntary, and the half-overlap goal does not
need to be met until the 2009 model year. 13 7 Oddly, the pact only applies to
vehicles under 10,000 pounds, which exempts the most massive SUVs like
the Hummer H1. 138
127. ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, THE FACTS ON SUV SAFETY (2004),
http://www.autoalliance.org/archives/suvsafety.pdf; Hakim, Safety Gap, supra note 48.
128. Danny Hakim, S.U. V's to Be Redesigned to Reduce Risk to Cars, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003,
at Al [hereinafter Hakim, Redesigned].
129. For instance, despite industry claims that SUVs are safe, Ford, in February 2005, launched an
ad campaign designed to teach young male drivers about the need to drive SUVs safely. Danny Hakim,
A message to the young: The S.U. V Is a Big, Hairy Beast to Drive, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2005, at CIO
[hereinafter Hakim, Beast].
130. Bradsher, Changes, supra note 108.
131. General Motors also began lowering its frame rails by two inches in 2001. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Hakim, Redesigned, supra note 128.
136. The pact came about after Dr. Runge, the NHTSA administrator, told automakers to voluntar-
ily come up with something, or face regulation. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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There is a real question as to whether these changes, provided they oc-
cur, will actually result in better crash compatibility. A recent NTHSA test
compared the redesigned 2003 Lincoln Navigator with the pre-reform 1999
version. 139 The 2003 Navigator, thanks to its blocker bar and lower
bumper, already met the standard promulgated by the December 2003 IIHS
pact. 140 The test crashed the 1999 and 2003 Navigators into a 1996 Dodge
Neon. 14 1 The result was, as predicted, less override from the 2003
model.142 However, the redesigned SUV caused worse injuries than the old
one; in fact, the dummy "driver" of the Neon hit by the 2003 model suf-
fered head and chest injuries more than twice as severe as the driver of the
Neon hit by the 1999 model. 143 The NHTSA surmised that the benefits of
the blocker bar and lower bumper had been more than offset by the fact
that the 2003 Navigator was stiffer and heavier than the 1999 version. 144
Even if SUVs are designed to be more crash-compatible by 2009, and
even if the benefits of front end overlap are not offset by ever-increasing
SUV mass and stiffness, millions of older SUVs will remain on the road.145
As they age, their brakes and suspensions will become suspect, leading to
more collisions and more chances to inflict lethal injuries. Even more dis-
tressingly, as the price of used SUVs decreases, these SUVs will fall into
the hands of teenagers and young male drivers, who tend to take more risks
and drive more carelessly. 146 As one automotive expert put it in 2004, "A
'97 Ford Expedition is seven years old and now down to an affordable
price that a young male could buy.... To have that barreling down the
road at 75 towards me is not something I'd like to think about."'14 7
Regulatory response to the problem has been nonexistent. When Dr.
Jeffrey Runge came to the NTSHA in 2002, he claimed to be determined to
139. NHTSA, RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 82, at 5.
140. Danny Hakim, Many Trucks, But Not All, Face Redesign In Safety Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2003, at C1. The Navigator is the twin to the Ford Excursion.
141. NHTSA, RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 82, at 5.
142. Id. at 6.
143. Id. at 7. In an understatement, an NHTSA researcher on the project said "[tihe driver of the
Neon hit by the '03 Navigator did not fare better.... He fared a little worse." Danny Hakim, Revamped
S.U.V Found To Cause Worse Injuries, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at C12.
144. NHTSA, RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 82, at 8.
145. Danny Hakim, Used S. U. V. 's Come Loaded, With Safety Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, June 26,
2005, § 4, at 3. According to the auto industry, the average vehicle stays on the road for 15 years or
170,000 miles. Id.
146. Joan Claybrook, the president of Public Citizen and a former top auto safety regulator, notes
that older SUVs will end up with drivers who are higher risk takers, more likely to speed, to drink and
drive, or not properly care for their vehicles' maintenance. Id. Similarly, the chief operating officer of
the IIHS notes that SUVs are likely to fall into the hands of young males, who are the highest risk group
of drivers. Danny Hakim, Is the Car Unsafe, or the Driver?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2005, at Cl.
147. Hakim, Beast, supra note 129.
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do something about vehicle incompatibility. 148 Instead, he approved of the
voluntary approach taken by the automakers. Moreover, in 2002, the Bush
Administration pushed through a tax loophole that allowed small busi-
nesses-including doctor and attorney practice groups-to write off most
of the purchase price of large SUVs such as Hummers.149
The insurance industry has taken a mixed approach. One might think
that insurance companies would demand higher premiums from drivers of
large SUVs, given the large damage costs incurred by these vehicles. 150 A
few insurance companies, such as Allstate and Progressive, adjust their
rates for larger SUVs. 15 1 Most, however, do not. 152 In fact, State Farm, the
nation's largest auto insurer, refuses to charge higher premiums for large
SUVs. 153 The reason: a State Farm actuary has explained that large SUVs
actually save money for insurers.1 54 This is because when an SUV collides
with a car, the occupants of the car are usually killed rather than
maimed. 155 For State Farm, death settlements are cheaper than injury set-
tlements. 156
II. LITIGATING SUV DESIGN AS A DESIGN DEFECT
A. Does an SUV Manufacturer Owe a Duty of Care to Collision Victims?
There has been no shortage of lawsuits against SUV manufacturers.
Most SUV litigation has focused on the injury to the SUV's occupants,
particularly in rollover accidents. 157 Many plaintiffs have successfully ar-
gued that the increased tendency of SUVs to rollover is a design defect that
creates unreasonable risks to their occupants. 158 However, in the case of an
SUV-car collision, there is a significant legal hurdle that a plaintiff would
need to overcome before recovering damages from the SUV manufacturer.
148. Hakim, Regulator Takes Aim, supra note 3.
149, Danny Hakim, In Tax Twist, Big Vehicles Get the Bigger Deductions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
2002, at C1. The amount of the tax break was rolled back to $25,000 in 2004 after criticism from tax-
payer and environmental groups. Danny Hakim, Senate Moves to Restrict Incentives for Big S. U. V. 's,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2004, at C2.
150. White, Arms Race, supra note 49, at 351.
151. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 213-15.
152. Id. at 220; White, Arms Race, supra note 49, at 351-52.
153. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 220.
154 Id. at 215.
155. Id.
156. Id.; see also Froma Harrop, Putting the Brakes on Suburban Assault Vehicles, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Nov. 3, 1997, at 10A.
157. See, e.g., Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663 (6th. Cir. 2000); Ford Motor Co. v. Ammer-
man, 705 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
158. See, e.g., Clay, 215 F.3d at 669-71.
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The problem is that when the plaintiff is an occupant of the car, rather than
the SUV, the injured party is not a user of the product. Thus, the initial
question in such a case is whether a lawsuit may even be brought against an
SUV manufacturer by a non-user who is injured as the result of an alleg-
edly defective design.
It is well settled that an automobile manufacturer owes a duty to by-
standers for those injuries that are foreseeable to the manufacturer. 159 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts states that a manufacturer can be liable for a
product defect that "he should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk
of causing physical harm to those who use it .. . and to those whom he
should expect to be endangered by its probable use .... ,,160 Comment (i)
explicitly addresses automobiles:
Thus the manufacturer of an automobile, intended to be driven on the
public highway, should reasonably expect that, if the automobile is dan-
gerously defective, harm will result to any person on the highway, in-
cluding pedestrians and drivers of other vehicles and their passengers
and guests. 16 1
The most influential case in applying this doctrine to carmakers is El-
more v. American Motors Corp., in which a defective driveshaft caused a
vehicle to lose control and strike another car. 162 The court noted that a de-
fective automobile is a danger "not only to the driver and passenger of the
car but also to pedestrians and other drivers." 163 The court reasoned:
The public policy which protects the driver and passenger of the car
should also protect the bystander, and where a driver or passenger of an-
other car is injured due to defects in the manufacture of an automo-
bile.., they may recover from the manufacturer of the defective
automobile. 164
Most, if not all jurisdictions have adopted bystander liability. 165 How-
ever, in the typical bystander liability case such as Elmore, the defect that
caused the injury to the plaintiff was also responsible for causing the acci-
dent itself.166 This would not be the case in a typical SUV-car collision.
159. See, e.g., Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1969).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965) (emphasis added).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 cmt. i (1965).
162. 451 P.2d at 85-86.
163. Id. at 89. See also Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 624 (N.Y. 1973) (holding automobile
manufacturer liable when a defective steering mechanism caused a car to lose control and strike another
car).
164. Elmore, 451 P.2d at 89.
165. See Valk Mfg. Co. v. Rangaswamy, 537 A.2d 622, 631 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) ("The
general consensus clearly favors 'bystander' recovery."), rev d on other grounds, Montgomery County
v. Valk Mfg. Co., 562 A.2d 1246 (Md. 1989).
166. See Elmore, 451 P.2d at 85-87 (defective driveshaft caused a Rambler to fishtail and cross the
center line, where it collided with the co-plaintiff's car).
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The injured car occupant would allege that the frame design, height, and
weight of the SUV constitute a design defect that poses an unreasonable
risk of harm to others. 167 However, unless these characteristics caused the
SUV to roll over and then collide with the car, it would be unlikely that
these characteristics would cause a collision in and of themselves. Instead,
the plaintiff would be alleging that in the event of any collision, the SUV's
design made her injuries worse than they would have otherwise been. Thus,
the next issue is whether an SUV manufacturer may be sued for injuries
that are enhanced by the SUV's allegedly defective design, when that de-
sign was not the cause of the collision in the first place.
Most jurisdictions have accepted an "enhanced injury" rule, also
known as the "crashworthiness" or "second collision" doctrine. 168 Under
the enhanced injury rule, an auto manufacturer may be held liable for inju-
ries sustained in an accident, even when a defect in the vehicle merely en-
hanced the injuries, but did not cause the accident. 169 The leading case
establishing the enhanced injury rule is Larsen v. General Motors.170 In
Larsen, the driver of a Chevy Corvair was injured when the Corvair's steer-
ing column rammed into his head after a head-on collision with another
car. 171 The steering column had nothing to do with the collision, but it was
positioned so that it absorbed the energy of the impact and was transformed
into a lethal projectile. 172 The crucial portion of the court's reasoning was
that accidents are foreseeable to a carmaker: "Collisions with or without
fault of the user are clearly foreseeable by the manufacturer and are statisti-
cally inevitable."' 173 Perhaps the most famous application of the enhanced
injury rule is in the Ford Pinto cases, in which improperly mounted gas
tanks exploded after rear-end collisions that would have been otherwise
unremarkable. 174
An occupant of a car struck by an SUV thus finds initial support for
her cause in two well-established doctrines. First, under bystander liability
167. See De Veer v. Land Rover N. Am., Inc., No. B141538, 2001 WL 34354946, *1 (Cal. Ct.
App. Aug. 14, 2001).
168. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 16 cmt. a, reporter's note (1998) ("The
Larsen [enhanced injury] rule appears now to be the unanimous position of American courts.").
169. See Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109 (7th Cir. 1977); D'Amario v. Ford Motor
Co., 806 So.2d 424, 426 (Fla. 2001); Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224, 226 (Iowa 1992); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 16 (a) (1998) ("When a product is defective at
the time of commercial sale or other distribution and the defect is a substantial factor in increasing the
plaintiffs harm beyond that which would have resulted from other causes, the product seller is subject
to liability for the increased harm.").
170. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
171. Id. at 497.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 502.
174. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981).
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doctrine, the manufacturer of the SUV can be liable to other drivers for
injuries resulting from a defective design. 175 Second, under the enhanced
injury rule, the SUV manufacturer may be liable for enhanced injuries re-
sulting from the defective design, even if that defective design was not the
cause of the accident. 176 However, the traditional application of these doc-
trines creates an additional hurdle. In the typical bystander liability case, as
discussed above, the allegedly defective design was the direct cause of the
accident that resulted in the injuries. This would not be the case here, where
the plaintiff would argue that the defective SUV design merely enhanced
the injuries she suffered from an accident that would have occurred any-
way. 177 Yet most enhanced injury cases involve injuries to the occupants of
the allegedly defective vehicle, and not to bystanders or other drivers.178 In
effect, the injured occupant of the car in an SUV-car collision would be
asking the court to combine the bystander liability and enhanced injury
doctrines. The court would have to accept the notion that the SUV manu-
facturer can be liable to occupants of other vehicles for their enhanced
injuries, suffered as the result of an allegedly defective design, even when
that defective design was not the cause of the accident.
There is substantial precedent for extending the enhanced injury rule
to apply to non-users of a product. In cases from the 1970s involving car-
motorcycle collisions, two circuit courts of appeal applied the enhanced
injury rule to the injured motorcyclists. In Passwaters v. General Motors,
the plaintiff-a passenger on a motorcycle that collided with a Buick-was
injured when her leg came into contact with one of the Buick's wheel cov-
ers.179 The wheel covers had protruding metal flanges that essentially
turned into propeller blades at highway speeds. 180 When the Buick collided
with the motorcyclist, the flanges sliced into the plaintiffs calf, nearly
severing her leg.181 The court noted that the accident was not caused by the
wheel covers, but by the Buick striking the motorcycle's handlebar while
trying to pass. 182 Nonetheless, after concluding that there was ample evi-
dence that this design was unsafe, the court stated, "We think it now settled
that a manufacturer does have the responsibility to avoid design in automo-
biles which can reasonably be foreseen as initially causing or aggravating
175. See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
177. See De Veer v. Land Rover N. Am., Inc., No. B141538, 2001 WL 34354946, *2 (Cal. Ct.
App. Aug. 14,2001).
178. See, e.g., Larsen, 391 F.2d at 497.
179. 454 F.2d 1270, 1272 (8th Cir. 1972) (applying Iowa law).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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serious injury to users of the highway when a collision occurs."'1 83 Thus, in
one fell swoop, the court accepted not only the enhanced injury rule, but it
extended the rule to all "users of the highway."'1 84 In fact, quoting Elmore,
the court reasoned that "[i]f anything, bystanders should be entitled to
greater protection than the consumer or user" of the vehicle. 185
In Knippen v. Ford, a motorcyclist was struck by a Mercury that made
a left turn in front of him. 186 Due to a sharp metal triangle in the Mercury's
turn signal assembly, the motorcyclist lost a good part of his lower left
leg.187 The court adopted the enhanced injury rule of Larsen, affirming the
trial court's decision that even though the metal triangle was not the cause
of the accident, Ford should be liable because the triangle enhanced Knip-
pen's injuries. 188 The court found nothing in Larsen to prevent an extension
of the enhanced injury rule to parties other than the occupants of the alleg-
edly defective vehicle, and noted the Passwaters holding with approval. 1 89
A more recent case provides further support. In Valk Manufacturing v.
Rangaswamy, the driver of a Toyota was impaled on a snowplow hitch and
killed when he was broadsided by a county truck.190 The hitch, without a
plow attached to it, protruded twenty-nine inches from the front of the
truck. 191 The plaintiffs, the driver's family, argued that the hitch was defec-
tive because it lacked a "quick disconnect hose." 192 The hose would have
made it easier to take off the hitch when the plow was not needed, because
it would have prevented the hydraulic fluid from draining out and having to
be replaced every time the hitch was reattached. 193 Expert testimony con-
cluded that the driver's injuries would have been significantly less severe
had there not been a twenty-nine inch steel rod thrusting into the passenger
cabin of the Toyota upon impact. 194 Unhesitatingly, the court applied the
enhanced injury rule. 195 The court noted the "massive and essentially
unanimous movement toward an expanded coverage for bystanders," and
held that the manufacturer of the hitch could be liable to the occupant of
183. Id. at 1276 (emphasis added).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1279 (quoting Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1969)).
186. 546 F.2d 993, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
187. Id.
188. Id. at995, 1001.
189. Id. at 1001.
190. 537 A.2d 622, 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, Montgomery County
v. Valk Mfg. Co., 562 A.2d 1246 (Md. 1989).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 628.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 633.
195. Id.
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the Toyota, even though he was not a user of the product. 196 Although the
decision was later reversed on grounds unrelated to the manufacturer's
liability to the plaintiffs, 197 the decision is a clear example where a court
had no qualms combining the bystander liability and the enhanced injury
doctrines.
As of the time of writing, only one case directly addresses the issue of
SUV-car collisions. In De Veer v. Land Rover, a California appellate court,
in an unpublished opinion, was unwilling to combine the bystander liability
doctrine with the enhanced injury rule. 198 In De Veer, a 1988 Range Rover
broadsided the plaintiffs Saab, leaving her with serious head injuries. 199
She sued Land Rover, the maker of the Range Rover, claiming that the
SUV's design enhanced her injuries.200 In particular, she claimed that the
SUV's bumper height, front end stiffness, and frame rail design were un-
reasonably dangerous.2 01 The court first disagreed with the plaintiffs asser-
tion that the design was unreasonably dangerous and thus defective.202
More importantly, the court held that the enhanced injury rule could not
extend to the occupants of other vehicles when the alleged defect did not
cause the initial collision.2 03 Ultimately, the court found that Range Rover
did not owe a duty to occupants of other vehicles who suffer enhanced
injuries.
The reasoning in De Veer runs counter to that of Passwaters, Knippen,
and Valk. It also neglects to follow established product liability principles
from its own jurisdiction, California. 204 Furthermore, in addition to the
above cases, bystanders have been allowed to recover for emotional dis-
tress suffered merely upon witnessing enhanced injuries caused by a prod-
uct defect.2 05 If a duty extends to those who might be traumatized by
196. Id. at631-32.
197. See Montgomery County v. Valk Mfg. Co., 562 A.2d 1246, 1253 (Md. 1989). There, Mary-
land's highest court reversed the appellate court's decision to allow the hitch manufacturer to pursue
contribution cross-claim against the county. Id. The court stated, "Nor do we comment on [the hitch
manufacturer's] liability to the plaintiffs." Id. at 1249 n.6.
198. De Veer v. Land Rover N. Am., Inc., No. B141538, 2001 WL 34354946, *3 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 14, 2001).
199. Id. at*l.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at *4.
203. Id. at *2-3.
204. See Latin, Bad Designs, supra note 1, at 1180 (noting that the trial court in De Veer "ignored
every influential California Supreme Court precedent" by finding that the SUV manufacturer owed no
duty to other motorists).
205. See, e.g., Shepard v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding that Ford
owed a duty and thus could be held liable to family members, who suffered emotional shock upon
witnessing a child thrown from the rear of a Pinto and run over because of a defective door lock).
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witnessing enhanced injuries, it makes little sense for there to be no duty to
those who actually suffer the enhanced injuries.
As of the time of writing, De Veer remains the only decided case on
the issue of SUV vehicle incompatibility. As a General Motors spokes-
woman puts it, "G.M. is not aware of a single court that has recognized
'incompatibility' as a valid basis for a lawsuit against an auto manufac-
turer."' 206 Nonetheless, the auto industry has begun settling lawsuits
brought over SUV and pickup truck incompatibility, some of them for mil-
lions of dollars. 207 No automaker has admitted liability, of course, and the
settlements are confidential. However, the auto manufacturers are clearly
not relying on the De Veer decision to prevent those injured by SUVs from
having their day in court.
B. The Risk- Utility Test: The Marginal Utility of SUVs
One or both of two different tests are used to determine whether a
product design is defective: a consumer expectations test, or risk-utility
balancing. 208 Under the consumer expectations approach, a product is de-
fective if it failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would ex-
pect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. 209 Under
the risk-utility analysis, which is sometimes called a risk-benefit test, 210 a
product is defective as designed if the degree of foreseeable risk of harm
outweighs the utility or other benefits of the product.2 11 The risks and bene-
fits of the product are contrasted with the probable risks and benefits of an
alternative design.212 If the alternative design would have made the product
safer without significant lost utility or benefit, then the product will be
considered "unreasonably dangerous. ''213 In the case of an injured occupant
of a car suing the manufacturer of the SUV that hit her, the plaintiff is not a
consumer of the product, and thus cannot proceed under the consumer ex-
pectations approach. Therefore, employing the risk-utility test, the reason-
206. Hakim & Alster, Lawsuits, supra note 24.
207. Id.
208. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 455-56 (Cal. 1978) ("[A] product may be found
defective in design ... under either of two alternative tests. First ... if the plaintiff establishes that the
product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner. Second if... the defendant fails to establish, in light of the relevant
factors, that, on balance, the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in
such design."); see also Latin, Bad Designs, supra note 1, at 1185.
209. Barker, 473 P.2d at 455-56.
210. West v. Johnson & Johnson Prod., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 457 (Ct. App. 1985).
211. PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 699 (5th ed. 1984).
212. Latin, Bad Designs, supra note 1, at 1184-85.
213. Id. at I 185; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
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ableness of the SUV design will be determined by balancing the risks
posed to others by design characteristics such as height, weight, and frame
rail design, with the benefits provided by these design characteristics. If the
benefits fail to outweigh the risks, when compared with less-risky alterna-
tive design characteristics, then the SUV design is unreasonably dangerous.
1. Safer Alternative SUV Designs
A plaintiff injured as the result of an SUV-car collision would likely
be required to show that a reasonable alternative design for the SUV would
have prevented her injuries. 214 Such alternative designs clearly exist, and
have actually been provided by the auto industry itself. As discussed in Part
I of this Note, Ford lowered the frame rails on its model year 2000 Ex-
plorer, and added a blocker bar to the Excursion. 215 These modifications
show that such alternatives do exist, and that auto makers have been aware
of them for some time. The December 2003 pact also indicated that alterna-
tive designs were already in place for some vehicles but not for others. 216
In addition, IIHS research has concluded that reducing the weight of large
SUVs would not affect the safety of their occupants, and would actually
provide a "net safety benefit" by saving lives in other vehicles. 217 Finally,
given the availability of NHTSA and IIHS studies on crash compatibil-
ity, 218 litigation discovery might turn up memos reflecting auto makers'
knowledge of the problem, and, possibly, alternative designs that were
turned down.
Proving the existence of safer alternative SUV designs will likely be
expensive and time-consuming. 219 Experts will need to be hired, including
accident reconstructionists and biomechanical engineers. 220 Discovery
battles will not be easily won against auto manufacturers with deep pock-
ets. However, these are practical hurdles that can be overcome, the details
of which are outside the scope of this Note. 221 The more pressing issue
concerns a discussion of the risks and benefits of SUVs.
214. Robert M.N. Palmer & William Petrus, LTVs: 'Safer' at What Cost?, TRIAL, Jan. 2000, at 44,
50 [hereinafter Palmer & Petrus, LTVs].
215. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
216. Hakim & Alster, Lawsuits, supra note 24.
217. Comprehensive New Study Lends Perspective to Debates About Fuel Economy and
Crash Compatibility, STATUS REPORT (Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety, Arlington, Va.), Mar. 6, 2004, at
4,6.
218. See supra notes 82-83.
219. Palmer & Petrus, LTVs, supra note 214, at 51.
220. Id.
221. For a more detailed discussion of design alternatives, see Latin, Bad Designs, supra note 1, at
1200-1213, and Palmer & Petrus, LTVs, supra note 214, at 50-51.
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2. The Inconsequential Utility of SUVs
Part I of this Note has discussed the risks posed to other drivers and
pedestrians by SUV frame stiffness, frame rail design, height, and
weight.222 This section will address the utility or benefits provided by these
SUV characteristics, if any, that would be lost if alternatives to these design
features were adopted. 223
Many consumers buy SUVs because they perceive them to be safer
than cars, 224 and the auto industry gladly fosters this perception. 225 Cer-
tainly, in the event of a collision with a small car, a large SUV may provide
more protection to its occupants (at the expense, of course, of the occupants
of the car). 226 However, as the IIHS concluded in a study of crash compati-
bility, it is "disingenuous for defenders of SUVs to claim they're safer than
cars," because that protection is simply a result of the sheer mass of an
SUV.227 Moreover, as discussed in Part I, SUVs are actually less safe for
their occupants than cars. 228 The fact remains that any safety benefits pro-
vided in a collision with a smaller vehicle are more than offset by the
SUV's tendency towards rollovers, and by the extra force transferred to the
passenger compartment by the stiffness of the SUV's frame when striking a
222. See supra notes 91-110 and accompanying text.
223. See Latin, Bad Designs, supra note 1, at 1185-86 (discussing the risk-utility balance factors
and their application). As noted above, other types of LTVs, particularly full-size pickups, also pose a
great danger to others. See supra notes 74-78; see also Hakim, Eclipsing, supra note 48. This Note does
not address pickups specifically, because pickups historically served a particular function: their truck
beds were used for hauling goods. This specific function distinguishes pickups from SUVs. The result is
that pickups have at least some concrete utility to be weighed against any danger posed to others, unlike
SUVs, which, as discussed in this section, have no utility. See infra notes 224-53 and accompanying
text.
Recently, however, many pickup buyers want their trucks to be "more SUV-like"--basically,
an SUV with the bonus of a truck bed. Hakim, Eclipsing, supra note 48. If these vehicles, like SUVs,
are indeed used like any passenger car, and not for a functional purpose, than the same analysis will
apply to these vehicles as to large SUVs.
224. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
225. Chevy touted the Blazer as "a little security in an insecure world," see Blazer,
http://www.chevy2l.com/blazer.htm (last visited Sep. 17, 2005), and Chrysler assured buyers that the
Jeep Grand Cherokee was "still the best insurance policy out there," see BRADSHER, HIGH AND
MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 127. A Chrysler executive admits that the perception that SUVs are better in a
crash has been an "important selling point." BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 108. See
also Hakim, Safety Gap, supra note 48 (noting that industry groups and lobbyists maintain that SUVs
are at least as safe as cars).
Fears of terrorism play a role as well. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, con-
sumer ratings of the Hummer soared. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 401.
226. Incompatibility of Vehicles in Crashes, STATUS REPORT (Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety, Ar-
lington, Va.), Apr. 26, 2003, at 6 (noting the "advantage in terms of self-protection" enjoyed by SUVs,
and the corresponding higher death rates in cars when SUVs collide with them).
227. Id.
228. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text. See also Hakim, Safety Gap, supra note 48
(occupants of SUVs 11% more likely to die than occupants of cars).
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fixed object.229 Thus, SUVs provide no safety benefits to consumers; any
perception of safety is purely illusory.
SUV advertising often touts the off-road abilities of the SUVs, pre-
senting vehicles climbing over boulders and scaling mountains. However,
few consumers actually take their SUVs off-road. Automotive market re-
search, in fact, shows that only 1% to 13% of SUV owners claim to go off-
road.230 This percentage varies based on the form of the question because
many research respondents are under the impression that "off-roading"
means going on any dirt or gravel road, however smoothly graded.231 As
Ford's SUV marketing manager puts it, "The only time those SUVs are
going to be off-road is when they miss the driveway at 3 a.m."'232
Another common defense of SUVs is their extra space, which SUV
owners claim to need for their families. 233 Indeed, SUVs are now the sec-
ond-most common way of transporting children, behind minivans. 234 How-
ever, minivans often provide the same amount of space and are much safer,
considering that a child in an SUV is twice as likely to die as a child in a
minivan.235 Nevertheless, SUV buyers almost never consider buying a
minivan instead.236
The reason is that minivan buyers and SUV buyers are very different
people. The auto industry's own research has found that many SUV buyers
tend to be insecure, vain, self-centered, and self-absorbed. 237 A Ford vehi-
cle strategist and market researcher, Jim Brulin, describes the mindset: "It's
about not letting anything get in your way and... intimidating others to get
out of your way."' 238 Much SUV advertising reflects this desire to intimi-
date and overpower. Advertisements command us to "yield" to the Esca-
229. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
230. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 113. Public Citizen estimates that only 1% to
10% of SUVs are used off-road or for towing. PUBLIC CITIZEN, HIGH COSTS, supra note 64, at 12.
231. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 113.
232. Id.(quote of J.C. Collins). SUVs are also defended on the grounds that their four-wheel-drive
capabilities are needed in bad weather. Gladwell, Big and Bad, supra note 5, at 32. This argument is a
non-starter. To begin with, four-wheel-drive does nothing to improve braking or turning on slippery
surfaces; the only benefit is the ability to accelerate without slipping in deep snow or mud. Id. This
"benefit" is actually a drawback because it gives the SUV driver a false sense of security, which often
causes the driver to go faster and allow less stopping space than is safe. Id. Finally, four-wheel drive is
available on a host of non-SUV vehicles, which are inherently easier to handle and require less stopping
distance. See, e.g., Subaru Outback, http://www.subaru.com/shop/model-consideration.jsp?
model=OUTBACK (last visited Sep. 17, 2005).
233. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 108.
234. PUBLIC CITIZEN, HIGH COSTS, supra note 64, at 10.
235. Id. Minivans ride closer to the ground, mitigating the rollover hazard, and afford their occu-
pants superior crash protection. Cooper, Attack, supra note 31, at 68.
236. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 108-09.
237. Id. at 101.
238. Id. at 106.
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lade,239 and promise that the new Lexus SUV arrives "now with added
intimidation. '240 The Dodge Durango was designed to resemble a "savage
jungle cat. '241 One young female SUV driver raves that her SUV "just
makes me feel powerful-if someone disses me, I can tailgate the crap out
of them. 242
SUV owners sometimes exhibit a "survival of the fittest" mentality.243
Clotaire Rapaille, an anthropologist who has advised Chrysler, Ford, and
General Motors on SUV consumer preferences, has concluded that SUVs
reflect a "reptilian desire for survival. '244 American consumers, he says,
increasingly fearful of crime and the threat of violence, want "armored cars
for the battlefield" they perceive to be around them.245 Since the terrorist
attacks of September 11 th, 2001, it is not hard to imagine that these fears
have deepened. 246 Unfortunately, however, a by-product of SUV owners'
instinctual desire for survival is a willingness to put other drivers at risk in
order to enhance their own safety.247 Rapaille maintains that many buyers
choose SUVs because they believe the SUV will demolish a smaller car in
a collision, thinking, "[i]f there's a crash, I want the other guy to die."'248
More than just desiring safety, it seems, some SUV owners are comfortable
with that safety-illusory as it is-coming at the expense of others.
In addition to a desire for protection, David Bostwick, Chrysler's
market research director, contends that people buy SUVs in order to gain a
feeling of control over the people and situations around them.249 Similarly,
a General Motors executive, discussing the difference between minivan and
SUV buyers, believes that while minivan drivers want to control the opera-
tion of their vehicle, SUV drivers want to control other people. 250 Provid-
ing that feeling of "command control" is the reason that manufacturers
mount SUV seats so high, even though that height contributes to both roll-
239. Id. at xix-xx.
240. Id. atIll.
241. Id. at 99.
242. Id. at 342.
243. Cooper, Attack, supra note 31, at 67; see also In Collisions with Cars, SUVs Are Incompatible.
Are SUVs That Are Bigger and Heavier Posing Even More Risks?, STATUS REPORT (Ins. Inst. for
Highway Safety, Arlington, Va.), Apr. 28, 2005, at 4 (displaying a cartoon referring to a large SUV as a
"S.D.V." "Social Darwinist Vehicle").
244. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 95-96.
245. Id. at 95-97.
246. See supra note 225.
247. BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY, supra note 1, at 100.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 108.
250. Id. at 104.
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overs and vehicle incompatibility. 251 This desire for empowerment cuts
across gender lines as well. John Wolkonowicz, an auto design and market-
ing consultant at Arthur D. Little, concluded that while men buy powerful
SUVs to compensate for a feeling of lost masculinity, "women are enjoying
flaunting the power they've achieved. '252
In short, SUVs offer little utility beyond a psychological benefit to
their owners. The feeling of empowerment, protection, and control result-
ing from SUV size, mass, and height is purely personal to the driver of the
SUV. Weighed against the litany of lethal injury and catastrophic damage
that these characteristics of SUV design cause to pedestrians and the occu-
pants of other vehicles, such a mere "feel-good" benefit cannot possibly be
justified.253
III. LITIGATING SUV DRIVING AS AN ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIVITY
In addition to litigating the dangers of SUVs as a design defect under a
products liability approach, plaintiffs have another option: to argue that
driving an SUV is an "ultrahazardous" or "abnormally dangerous" activity.
Under this approach, the driver of the SUV would be subject to strict liabil-
ity for any injuries to nonoccupants resulting from a collision with another
vehicle or a pedestrian, regardless of who was at fault.
At first glance, this argument might seem implausible. After all, strict
liability for routine traffic accidents, and with it the notion that driving was
ultrahazardous, was dismissed by courts early in the twentieth century.
However, as has been discussed in Part I of this Note, SUVs create risks to
others far above and beyond the usual risks created by passenger cars. This
is particularly true for "behemoth" SUVs like the Hummer and the new
CTX. As SUVs continue to get larger, heavier, stiffer, and higher, they
have become so dangerous to others that strict liability is justified.
This section will discuss the doctrine of ultrahazardous strict liability,
and how it could relate to SUVs. The discussion will begin with an over-
view of the doctrine, the role of the Restatements, and the principles drawn
from several decades of cases. Next, SUVs will be discussed in light of
251. Id. Another reason for the extra height of SUVs is even less substantial. SUV roof height is the
same as that of large pickups; the reason, said Ford's truck engineering director, for the extra height is
to allow Texans to wear their cowboy hats while driving. Id. at 245.
252. Bradsher, Domination, supra note 32.
253. In fact, putting others at risk to obtain such a purely private benefit often leads to the imposi-
tion of punitive damages. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981)
(upholding an award of punitive damages where Ford could have fixed, at minimal cost, a defect in the
Pinto which it knew could cause serious injury or death, but where Ford instead engaged in a cost-
benefit analysis and chose to protect its profits).
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those principles. Correctly understood, ultrahazardous strict liability for
SUVs is a plausible alternative, one that is justified under bothi the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts and traditional principles of ultrahazardous
strict liability.
A. An Overview of Ultrahazardous Strict Liability
The default rule of liability for unintentional injuries is negligence. 254
However, some pockets of strict liability exist as exceptions to the general
rule. A common example is the law of trespass, under which the trespasser
is strictly liable for damages, no matter how justifiable and non-negligent
the intrusion.255 Another is the statutory scheme of Workers' Compensa-
tion laws, under which an injured worker need not prove negligence on the
part of her employer.256 Strict liability is also applied to manufacturing
defects in products liability cases. 257 One of the more intriguing strict li-
ability doctrines is strict liability for ultrahazardous activities, recognized
by English courts in the landmark case of Fletcher v. Rylands.258 The broad
idea behind the doctrine is that strict liability is justified because some ac-
tivities, even if carried on with all reasonable care, are so inherently dan-
gerous that those who engage in them should be liable to nonparticipants
for any injuries resulting from a loss of control of the activity. 259
1. Early History: Fletcher v. Rylands and its Adoption in the United
States
In Fletcher v. Rylands, the defendant mill owner built a reservoir on
his land, unaware of a network of ancient coal mining shafts under the
property; when he filled the reservoir, the shafts flooded, with the flood
eventually spreading to the plaintiffs adjoining coal mines. 26 0 Justice
Blackburn, holding the defendant liable for damages despite the defen-
dant's lack of negligence, articulated a theory of strict liability:
254. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The
baseline common law regime of tort liability is negligence.").
255. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 NW. 221 (Minn. 1910).
256. See Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented Approach to Strict Tort Liability for Abnormally
Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 385-86 (1996) [hereinafter King, Goals Approach].
257. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1162 (Cal. 1972).
258. 1 L.R. Exch. 265 (1866), affd, Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.E. & 1. App. 330 (H.L. 1868).
259. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977) ("The essential question is whether
the risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the circumstances surround-
ing it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability for the harm that results from it, even though it is
carried on with all reasonable care.").
260. Rylands, 3 L.R.E. & 1. App. at 332.
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the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings
on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if
it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima
facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of
its escape. 26 1
American courts initially rejected Blackburn's "true rule," fearing im-
pediments to progress in a rapidly industrializing nation.26 2 Reflecting the
prominence of the no-liability-without-fault ideal, New York's highest
court declared, "[T]he rule is... [with] no exceptions or limitations, that
no one can be made liable for injuries to the person or property of another
without some fault or negligence on his part. '263 Courts were likely con-
cerned that subjecting industry to excessive liability would stifle economic
growth-a familiar American refrain.264
Nonetheless, by the early part of the twentieth century, courts in the
U.S. began to adopt the Rylands rule, holding defendants liable for injuries
caused by certain activities even in the absence of negligence. Typical early
cases involved the storing of nitroglycerin, 265 exploding oil wells, 266 and
blasting operations. 267 The reasoning behind the imposition of strict liabil-
ity in these cases was two-fold: first, a recognition of the inherent danger-
ousness of certain activities; 268 second, a concern that those injured by the
activity were not only unable to protect themselves, but had no relation to
the risky activity other than the fact that they were injured by it.269 For
example, in Exner v. Sherman Power Construction, the plaintiff was in-
jured, and her house damaged, by the concussion of exploding dynamite
that had been stored on nearby property.2 70 Adopting the rule of Rylands,
Judge Augustus Hand wrote,
When, as here, the defendant, though without fault, has engaged in the
perilous activity of storing large quantities of a dangerous explosive for
use in his business, we think there is no justification for relieving it of li-
ability, and that the owner of the business, rather than a third person who
261. Fletcher, I L.R. Exch. at 279. Upon appeal to the House of Lords, Justice Blackburn's opinion
was affirmed, with additional language which referred to the defendant's "non-natural use" of his land.
Rylands, 3 L.R.E. & I. App. at 339.
262. See, e.g., Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 448 (1873) (holding that no "legal principle can
throw so serious an obstacle in the way of progress and improvement").
263. Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 491 (1873).
264. See Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict
Liability, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257, 262 (1987) [hereinafter Nolan & Ursin, Revitalization).
265. Bradford Glycerine Co. v. St. Marys Woolen Mfg. Co., 54 N.E. 528, 531 (Ohio 1899).
266. Green v. Gen. Petroleum Corp., 270 P. 952 (Cal. 1928).
267. Asheville Const. Co. v. S. Ry. Co., 19 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1927).
268. See Bradford, 54 N.E. at 531.
269. See Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931).
270. Id. at 511.
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has no relation to the explosion, other than that of injury, should bear the
loss. 2 7 1
In short, courts were beginning to recognize that in cases where de-
fendants had engaged in inherently risky activities, the imposition of strict
liability for injuries to those who neither engaged in nor sought to benefit
from the activity was justified on principles of fairness and good public
policy. The California Supreme Court, explaining its holding in the 1928
case of Green v. General Petroleum, in which plaintiff had been injured
from debris from a neighbor's exploding oil well, stated, "The important
factor is that certain activities under certain conditions may be so hazardous
to the public generally, and of such relative infrequent occurrence, that it
may well call for strict liability as the best public policy. ' 272 In Green, the
court had used a "fairness" rationale even more explicit than the court used
in Exner, stating,
Where one, in the conduct and maintenance of an enterprise lawful and
proper in itself, deliberately does an act ... and injury is done to the
other as the direct and proximate consequence of the act, however care-
fully done, the one who does the act and causes the injury should, in all
fairness, be required to compensate the other for the damage done.2 73
One would think that with the growth of industry, technology, and
their accompanying dangers, courts since Green and Exner would have
greatly expanded the doctrine of strict liability for hazardous activities.
Certainly, "perilous" activities such as the storing of dynamite or oil drill-
ing seem tame compared to today's shadowy and unpredictable threats of
toxic waste, radioactive materials, and explosive chemicals that can be
bought off the shelf in the hardware store. However, with the promulgation
of the Restatement (First) of Torts in the 1930s and the Restatement (Sec-
ond) in the 1960s and 70s, the expansion of the doctrine has been uneven,
and its application unpredictable. 274 Both Restatements added restrictive
criteria to the doctrine, which tended to limit it to a narrow class of
cases.
275
271. Id. at 514.
272. Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1948) (discussing Green v. Gen. Petroleum, 270 P.
952 (Cal. 1928)).
273. Green v. Gen. Petroleum Corp., 270 P. 952, 955 (Cal. 1928) (emphasis added).
274. See Nolan & Ursin, Revitalization, supra note 264, at 265, 267.
275. Id. at 267, 270.
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2. First Restatement: Exempting Activities of "Common Usage"
The Restatement (First) of Torts provided for strict liability for "ultra-
hazardous" activities. 276 An "ultrahazardous" activity was defined in the
Restatement (First) as one which "(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious
harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated
by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common us-
age."' 277 Thus, the Restatement (First) added a new restriction that had been
missing from Rylands and the early "ultrahazardous" cases discussed
above: all activities of "common usage" were now excluded from strict
liability. Not only would this exempt activities such as driving and operat-
ing railroads, but it could have mandated a different result in cases like
Green (oil drilling) and Exner (storing explosives), where the activities
involved were at least not uncommon. 278 By excluding activities of "com-
mon usage" from strict liability, the Restatement assured that the doctrine
of strict liability for ultrahazardous activities would have little practical
significance. 279
At least one court, however, circumvented the Restatement's "com-
mon usage" restraint. In Luthringer v. Moore, decided in 1948, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court extended strict liability for ultrahazardous activity to
pest control. 280 There, the defendant had sprayed for cockroaches in the
basement of a restaurant around midnight.2 8 1 The gas leaked through to the
basement of the pharmacy next door, and the following morning, the plain-
tiff, a pharmacy employee, was knocked unconscious by the fumes. 282
Quoting the Restatement (First), the court found that the fumigation was an
"ultra-hazardous activity. '2 83 The court concluded, however, that spraying
for cockroaches was not an activity of "common usage." 2 84 The court did
this by defining the activity in the narrowest possible terms, as one carried
out only by professional fumigators, who it said were "few in number. '285
276. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 519 (1938) ("[O]ne who carries on an ultrahazardous
activity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be
harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which
makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm.").
277. Id. § 520.
278. See supra notes 260-273 and accompanying text.
279. Nolan & Ursin, Revitalization, supra note 264, at 267.
280. 190 P.2d I (Cal. 1948).
281. Id. at 3.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 7.
284. Id. at 8.
285. Id.
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Thus, the court in effect "defined out" the activity so that it would not be
one of "common usage."
3. Second Restatement: Confusion and a Quasi-Negligence Test
The Second Restatement adopted a different framework. 286 The first
change was largely cosmetic, replacing "ultrahazardous" with "abnormally
dangerous. ' 287 While holding to the idea that strict liability would attach to
the abnormally dangerous activity, 288 the Restatement (Second) defined
"abnormally dangerous" by listing six factors to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or
chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dan-
gerous attributes. 289
The first four factors are generally derived from the Restatement
(First), while (e) and (f) are new. While the additional factors would appear
to make the definition of "abnormally dangerous" even more restrictive
than was "ultrahazardous" in the Restatement (First), the test lacks teeth
because these are only factors to be considered, rather than required ele-
ments.290 Not all factors have to be fulfilled for an activity to be abnor-
mally dangerous. 291 Furthermore, factor (c) appears to loosen the test by
replacing "utmost care" in the Restatement (First) with "reasonable
care. ' 292 Similarly, factor (d), the "common usage" factor, instructs courts
to merely consider the "extent to which" the activity is not common usage,
286. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1977).
287. Id. According to the drafters, "a combination of the factors ... is commonly expressed by
saying that the activity is 'ultrahazardous,' or 'extra-hazardous."' Id. § 520 cmt. h. This Note uses the
terms "abnormally dangerous" and "ultrahazardous" interchangeably.
288. Id. § 519.
289. Id. § 520.
290. Id. § 520 cmt. f. The drafters instructed,
In determining whether the danger is abnormal, the factors listed in Clauses (a) to (f) of this
Section are all to be considered, and are all of importance. Any one of them is not necessarily
sufficient of itself in a particular case, and ordinarily several of them will be required for strict
liability. On the other hand, it is not necessary that each of them be present, especially if oth-
ers weigh heavily. Because of the interplay of these various factors, it is not possible to re-
duce abnormally dangerous activities to any definition.
Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. § 520.
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rather than categorically excluding common activities.293 At first blush,
then, the first four factors might seem to lessen the burden on the plaintiff
trying to pursue strict liability for ultrahazardous, or abnormally dangerous,
activities.
However, factors (e) and (f) inject new variables. Factor (e) instructs
courts to consider whether the dangerous activity was appropriate to its
location, something that was entirely absent from the Restatement
(First). 294 Factor (f) directs courts to balance the risks of the dangerous
activity against its "value to the community." Taken together, these factors
suggest, rather than a strict liability rule, a risk-utility balancing and rea-
sonableness test, similar to a negligence test. 295 Some courts have criticized
or rejected the Restatement (Second) precisely because of these two fac-
tors. 29
6
For example, in Koos v. Roth, the Oregon Supreme Court in 1982
flatly rejected factors (e) and (f) while holding that a farmer burning his
fields was strictly liable for the damage caused to a neighbor when the fire
spread. 297 Acknowledging the "appropriateness" of agricultural field burn-
ing to its location, the court explicitly declined to follow factor (e), stating
that "an activity is not otherwise immune from strict liability because it is
'appropriate' in its place. '298 Similarly, the court found "value to the com-
munity" to be irrelevant to the concept of strict liability.299 The proper in-
quiry, the court held, was not a subjective evaluation of the activity's
economic or other societal importance, but rather "who shall pay for harm
that has been done."'300 The court found it illogical that the costs of the
activity should be borne by others simply because the activity was valu-
able. 301
293. Id.
294. Id. The source of this factor appears to be Lord Crain's opinion in Rylands v. Fletcher, which
referred to the defendant's "non-natural" use of his land. 3 L.R.E. & 1. App. 330, 339 (H.L. 1868). The
drafters' comments refer to the "English cases" and "non-natural use" of land. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 520 cmt. j.
295. See Yukon Equip. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska 1978) ("Such
factors suggest a negligence standard."); DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 952-53 (West 2000) ("[T]hese
factors look like a poorly disguised negligence regime."); Nolan & Ursin, Revitalization, supra note
264, at 272-73.
296. See, e.g., Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255 (Or. 1982); Yukon, 585 P.2d at 1211.
297. 652 P.2dat 1261, 1263.
298. Id. at 1263.
299. Id. at 1262.
300. Id.
301. Id.
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Koos emphasized that the focus should be on evaluating the danger-
ousness of the activity itself, by assessing both the probability and the
magnitude of the threatened harm. 302 Thus,
"[i]f the consequences of a mishap are potentially lethal or highly de-
structive of health or property, a slight likelihood that they will occur
suffices.... Conversely... even when the risk 'only moderately threat-
ens economic activities rather than harm to life, health, or property or
environment,' the activity may carry strict liability if the consequences
are highly probable .... ,,303
The determination of whether an activity is ultrahazardous is thus
based on "the magnitude of harmful events and their probability despite all
reasonable precautions .... ,,304
Remarkably, the court not only rejected the "value to the community"
factor, but in explaining why, reached back beyond the Restatement (First)
to Exner. The court approvingly quoted Judge Hand's rationale that the
person carrying on the risky activity, rather than the victim who had no
relation to the activity other than being injured by it, should bear the
loss. 305 The Koos court elaborated that "the person conducting the activity
can choose whether or not to chance the potentially costly conse-
quences ... [but] the potential victim cannot make that choice. '306
Finally, the court in Koos, like the court in Lothringer, circumvented
the "common usage" factor through its definition of the activity. Instead of
"fire," which would of course be an activity of "common usage," the court
referred to the defendant's fire as agricultural "field burning," which is not
carried out by most people, nor even by most farmers. 307 However, the
court did recognize that the technique is "widely employed for certain
kinds of crops."'308 Clearly, the court did not attach much significance to
the "common usage" factor once it had considered the magnitude of the
risks posed by field burning.309
302. Id. at 1260.
303. Id. at 1260-61.
304. Id. at 1261.
305. Id. at 1262.
306. Id. at 1262-63.
307. Id. at 1265.
308. Id.
309. Courts have defined activities so as to fit or not fit "common usage" in wildly inconsistent
ways. For instance, in Doe v. Johnson, the plaintiff claimed that her sex partner engaged in ultrahazard-
ous activity because he had sex with her when he had AIDS. 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (W.D. Mich.
1993) (applying Michigan law). The court decided that "[s]exual activity is not an uncommon en-
deavor," and dismissed the claim. Id. at 1398. A better definition of the activity, however, would have
been "sexual activity while carrying the AIDS virus," which would probably have led to a different
conclusion.
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The Supreme Court of Alaska also preferred Exner to the Restatement
(Second). In Yukon Equipment v. Fireman's Fund Insurance, a case involv-
ing the explosion of stored explosives, the court declared, "[W]e do not
believe that the Restatement (Second) approach should be used.... In-
stead, we adhere to the rule of Exner .... 3 10 The court felt that the Re-
statement's process of weighing degrees of risk, difficulty of eliminating
risk, and appropriateness of place "suggest a negligence standard."' 311 Like
Koos, the Yukon court relied on Judge Hand's fairness rationale: "As be-
tween those who have created the risk for the benefit of their own enter-
prise and those whose only connection with the enterprise is to have
suffered damage because of it, the law places the risk of loss on the for-
mer."
312
Other courts, while not expressly rejecting the Restatement, have cir-
cumvented one or more of the six factors. In Siegler v. Kulhman, the victim
perished when she drove through a flaming pool of gasoline that had
spilled when the defendant's gasoline trailer had disengaged and rolled
down a hill.3 13 The Supreme Court of Washington, finding no error in the
jury's verdict that the defendant had not been negligent, nonetheless ap-
plied strict liability.314 The court began its analysis by quoting Blackburn's
"true rule. '3 15 Then, before mentioning either Restatement, the court dis-
cussed why the transportation of gasoline on the highways justified "appli-
cation of the Rylands v. Fletcher rule."'316 The court emphasized the nature
of risks posed by the tanker, referring to the "uniquely hazardous character-
istics" and "extraordinary dangers deriving from sheer quantity, bulk and
weight, which enormously multiply its hazardous properties. '317 Next, the
court, as in the cases above, discussed fairness, "putting the burden where it
should belong as a matter of abstract justice, that is, upon the one of the
two innocent parties whose acts instigated or made the harm possi-
ble .... -318 Having thus decided the issue on the basis of the dangerous-
ness of the activity and fairness to the victim, the court quoted the
Restatement (Second) almost as an afterthought. 319 Without discussing any
of the six factors specifically, the court declared that "hauling gasoline as
310. 585 P.2d 1206, 1211 (Alaska 1978).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1212.
313. 502 P.2d 1181, 1182 (Wash. 1972).
314. Id. at 1184.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1185.
319. Id. at 1186-87.
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cargo is undeniably an abnormally dangerous activity and on its face pos-
sesses all of the factors necessary for imposition of strict liability as set
forth in the Restatement .... -320
Clearly, the court gave little or no weight to "common usage," "ap-
propriateness to the location," or "value to the community." All were pre-
sent here: carrying gas in on the highway is common (even if defined as
transporting it in tankers); the location was appropriate (where else but the
highway could this be done?); and certainly, the delivery of gasoline to
stations has value to the community. The fact that the court imposed strict
liability in the face of three of the six factors weighing against it implies
that the court did not feel restricted by the approach of the Restatement
(Second). 321
Four years later, the same court, applying strict liability in a crop dust-
ing case, exhibited similar disregard for the six factors. In Langan v. Vali-
copters, the defendant's pesticides landed on a neighbor's organic farm,
leading to the revocation of the plaintiff's organic food license. 322 Claiming
to have "adopted" the Restatement (Second) in Siegler,323 the court de-
clared that "each test of the Restatement is met. '324 However, the court's
own analysis of the factors belies this assertion. For the "common usage"
factor, the court concluded that crop dusting was not common, despite ac-
knowledging "the prevalence of crop dusting," the fact that it is "ordinarily
done in large portions of the Yakima Valley," and that 287 aircraft were
used to for crop dusting in that valley in 1975.325 Similarly, for the "appro-
priateness to location" factor, the court simply declared that crop dusting
was inappropriate, 326 ignoring the obvious fact that crop dusting was en-
tirely appropriate in a farming community.327 Finally, for the "value to the
community" factor, the court freely admitted that pesticides are "socially
valuable" and "benefit society," but disregarded this entirely. 328 The court
returned to the idea of fairness: "[W]e must ask who should bear the loss
caused by the pesticides. '329
320. Id. at 1187.
321. Nolan & Ursin, Revitalization, supra note 264, at 274-75.
322. 567 P.2d 218, 219-20 (Wash. 1977).
323. Id. at 221 (citing Siegler, 502 P.2d 1181).
324. Id. at 222.
325. Id. at 223.
326. Id.
327. Nolan & Ursin, Revitalization, supra note 264, at 276.
328. Langan, 567 P.2d at 223.
329. Id.
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At least one court has even more explicitly disregarded the "common
usage" factor. In a recent toxic tort case 330 in the Virgin Islands, the defen-
dants' underground service station tanks had leaked into the St. Thomas
water supply. 331 Holding that the storage of gasoline tanks above an aquifer
was an abnormally dangerous use of land that allowed the imposition of
strict liability, the U.S. district court freely acknowledged that the operation
of gas stations, even in residential areas, is an activity of "common us-
age. '332 However, the court brushed this aside, focusing instead on the
magnitude of this risk, which had in fact led to the contamination of the
island's most productive source of water.333 In fact, once such extreme
danger had been established, all the other Restatement factors fell into
place: there could be no appropriateness of location, no value to the com-
munity, and no way to eliminate the risk.334 The nature of the risk, com-
bined with the fact that the victims had no notice or opportunity to prepare
for it, was sufficient for strict liability.335
B. Principles and Misconceptions of Ultrahazardous Strict Liability
1. Fairness
The above cases illustrate that while courts may pay lip service to the
Restatements when considering ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous
activity cases, the true basis of the decision often rests on different princi-
ples. Two basic themes emerge from the cases discussed above. The first is
a willingness to look beyond Restatement constraints such as "common
usage," "appropriateness to location," and "value to the community," and
instead focus on the nature of the risks and dangers posed by the activity.336
The second is the idea of fairness. 337 Both of these themes have particular
significance in considering whether driving a SUV can be an ultrahazard-
330. Many modem ultrahazardous cases involve toxic waste. See, e.g., Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v.
Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150, 160 (N.J. 1983); Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1545 (10th Cir.
1992); Albahary v. City & Town of Bristol, 963 F. Supp. 150, 156 (D. Conn. 1997).
331. In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 846 F. Supp. 1243, 1269 (D.V.I. 1993) (applying
Virgin Islands law).
332. Id. at 1269-70.
333. Id. at 1269.
334. Id. at 1270.
335. See King, Goals Approach, supra note 256, at 369 (discussing the court's reasoning in Tutu
Wells).
336. See, e.g., Siegler v. Kulhman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Wash. 1972).
337. See King, Goals Approach, supra note 256, at 359; Nolan & Ursin, Revitalization, supra note
264, at 290.
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ous activity. The first has been discussed above, and its implications as to
SUVs will be discussed below. The second requires some elaboration.
As noted in the cases above, courts in ultrahazardous cases have often
justified strict liability by a fairness rationale, contrasting the risks and
rewards of the dangerous activity as to those carrying it out with the risks
to those injured by it. One component of the fairness rationale involves a
comparison of the risk-creating activity of the defendant with the relative
passivity of the plaintiff. In Exner and Yukon, for example, the courts em-
phasized that the plaintiffs had no relation to the activity, other than being
injured by it. 338 Koos noted that the defendant could choose whether or not
to engage in the risky activity, whereas the plaintiff could not.339 Essen-
tially, strict liability is appropriate under this rationale because the defen-
dant's activity involves one-sided risk creation, where the plaintiff who is
injured by the activity creates no similar risk and indeed is powerless to
affect the risks created.340 Indeed, Justice Blackburn articulated this princi-
ple in Rylands: "[T]here is no ground for saying that the plaintiff here took
upon himself any risk arising from the uses to which defendants should
choose to apply their land." 34 1
Another component of the fairness rationale contrasts the plaintiffs
lack of relation to the activity with the defendant's profiting from it.342
Yukon compared the victim's lack of relation to the stored explosives with
the defendant's "benefit of their own enterprise." 343 Langan was more
blunt: because the crop-dusting and farming defendants "will all profit
from the continued application of pesticides," they must be "made to pay
for the consequences of their acts. ' 344 Thus, instead of the Restatement
(Second)'s "value to the community" factor, these cases suggest an inverse
338. Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931); Yukon Equip. v. Fire-
man's Fund Ins. Co., 585 P.2d 1206, 1212 (Alaska 1978).
339. Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255, 1262-63 (Or. 1982).
340. Nolan & Ursin, Revitalization, supra note 264, at 290-91. See also George P. Fletcher, Fair-
ness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 546-49 (1972) [hereinafter Fletcher, Fairness]
(arguing that that strict liability for ultrahazardous activities is justified under the principle of "nonre-
ciprocal risk-taking," where the victim has not engaged in any reciprocal risk-creating activity, beyond
those "innocuous" risks "to which all members of the community contribute in roughly equal shares");
William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705, 1751 (1992)
("The case for strict liability is strongest when one party, the injurer, controls the instrumentality of
harm, and the other, the victim, is essentially passive.").
341. Fletcher v. Rylands, I L.R. Exch. 265, 287 (1866).
342. This component of the rationale is consistent with strict liability for product liability. See
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 27 (1980) ("[A]s against an innocent plain-
tiff who has nothing to do with the creation of the harm in question, it is only too clear that the defen-
dant who captures the entire benefit of his own activities should, to the extent the law can make it so,
also bear its entire costs.").
343. Yukon, 585 P.2dat 1212.
344. Langan v.Valicopters, 567 P.2d 218, 223 (Wash. 1977).
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"value to the defendant" factor, which is held against, not in favor of, the
defendant. 345 The end result, as articulated by the Washington Supreme
Court in Siegler, involves a quasi-instinctual "putting the burden where it
should belong. '346
2. Misconceptions of "Inability to Eliminate the Risk"
Before turning to the question of whether driving an SUV is ultrahaz-
ardous, the issue of "inability to eliminate the risk" must be addressed.
When evaluating the risky nature of an allegedly ultrahazardous activity,
one of the factors used by the Restatement (Second) to define "abnormally
dangerous" is the "inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reason-
able care. '347 This use of the "reasonable care" language of negligence law
can lead to a fundamental misconception of ultrahazardous strict liability.
The problem is that the risk of an activity can be viewed in two different
ways. Consider Fletcher v. Rylands, the case that originated the doctrine:
was the risk in that the water in the reservoir was likely to escape, or was
the risk in that the water would cause great damage if it escaped? Lord
Blackburn answered the question: "likely to do mischief if it escapes. '348
The difference is crucial. If an activity is considered ultrahazardous be-
cause it is hard to prevent its escape, then the inquiry will always begin by
considering whether or not the defendant used the proper standard of care
in (unsuccessfully) preventing the escape. Then the proper standard of care
will be have to be determined, which leads to a circular inquiry, as the
more dangerous the activity, the higher the standard of care. This analysis
simply misses the point. The purpose of ultrahazardous strict liability is not
to determine whether the defendant was negligent. It simply does not mat-
345. Nolan and Ursin, in fact, suggest that the fact that the defendant created the risks in the course
of "commercial activity" should be a deciding factor in ultrahazardous strict liability cases. Nolan &
Ursin, Revitalization, supra note 264, at 297-304. However, there is no principled reason to limit this
concept to activities carried on for monetary profit. If the gain to the defendant is purely psychological,
rather than monetary, there should be even less justification for the risk created to the innocent plaintiff.
346. Siegler v. Kulhman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1185 (Wash. 1972).
347. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(c) (1977). This was a change from the Restate-
ment (First), which required the plaintiff to prove an inability to eliminate the risks through "utmost
care." See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 (1938). The drafters justified the change from "ut-
most care" by stating that there was "probably no activity, unless it is perhaps the use of atomic energy,
from which all risks of harm could not be eliminated by the taking of all conceivable precautions ...."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. h (1977). This is a questionable proposition. Every
activity, however innocuous and however many precautions are taken, creates at least some, even
infinitesimal, risk.
In any event, it is immaterial whether the standard is "utmost care" or "reasonable care." As
discussed in this section, the proper focus in an ultrahazardous strict liability analysis is on the risks
posed by the activity, rather than on the defendant's standard of care. See infra notes 348-59 and ac-
companying text.
348. 1 L.R. Exch. 265, 279 (1866).
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ter whether he was or not. The "ultrahazardousness" of the activity does not
depend on its likelihood of "escape," which in turn depends on the defen-
dant's care; rather, the activity is "ultrahazardous" because of the "mis-
chief' it will cause if it gets out.
As a result of this misconception, some courts have interpreted factor
(c) of the Restatement (Second) to mean that ultrahazardous strict liability
applies only when a plaintiff has first proved that a defendant has been non-
negligent.349 For example, in Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad v. American
Cyanamid Co., a railroad tank car containing the highly toxic chemical
acrylonitrile leaked and spilled.350 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's strict liability holding. 351 The court reasoned
that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant railroad had not been
negligent; thus, there was no need to "switch" to strict liability.35 2 The
court decided that the dispositive question was, "how likely is this type of
accident if the actor uses due care?" 353 This was the wrong question. The
right question would have been, "what happens when acrylonitrile gets out,
regardless of whether the defendant used due care?"
Choosing to focus on the defendant's level of care leads to an absurd
result. If an activity is ultrahazardous when the defendant is not negligent,
then how can the activity become less hazardous if the defendant is negli-
gent? The hazards of the activity itself remain the same, no matter what the
defendant does. The court in Siegler understood this. There, someone's
negligence had obviously caused the gasoline tanker to disconnect from the
truck.354 However, not only was the defendant's probable negligence im-
material, but the court disregarded anyone's negligence. In light of the risks
posed by hauling gas on the highway, the court disregarded "the negligence
of third parties,. . . latent defects in the highways and streets,... [and] all
of the other hazards not generally disclosed or guarded against by reason-
able care, prudence and foresight." 355 The proper focus was on the extreme
danger posed by the gasoline tanker and the damage caused if something
were to go wrong, rather than the care used by the defendant.
349. See, e.g., Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1179 (7th Cir. 1990);
Gerald W. Boston, Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activity: The Negligence Barrier, 36 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 597, 632-33 (1999).
350. 916 F.2d at 1175.
351. Id. at 1183.
352. Id. at 1177.
353. Id. at 1179.
354. Siegler v. Kulhman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1185 (Wash. 1972). Much of the evidence had been
destroyed in the explosion, but this factor was not the basis of the court's decision. Id.
355. Id. at 1187.
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Similarly, in Laterra v. Treaster, the court imposed strict liability de-
spite the defendant's obvious negligence. 356 There, a woman committed
suicide by running her car in a closed garage. 357 However, she failed to
consider that she was living in a duplex; as a result, the plaintiff in the other
half of the house was killed while he slept. 358 Undoubtedly, the woman was
negligent. However, recognizing that there was no need to force the plain-
tiff to prove that the defendant had not been negligent, the court held that
she had engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity. 359 Like the cases
discussed above, and unlike Indiana Harbor Belt, the court properly fo-
cused on the dangers posed by the activity, combined with the victim's
utter lack of relation to that activity.
Thus, like the other Restatement factors and restrictions, the defen-
dant's "inability to eliminate the risk" is often misunderstood, misapplied,
or ignored altogether. What the above cases show is that some courts have
been willing to reject attempts to exclude the application of ultrahazardous
strict liability, attempts that exempt activities based on their "common us-
age," "value to the community," and "appropriateness of location." Instead,
these courts have adhered to the principles that led to the adoption of the
doctrine in the first place: a recognition of the extraordinary inherent risks
of certain activities, combined with an overarching concern of basic fair-
ness to innocent victims injured as a result. It is in light of these principles
that the question of whether driving an SUV is ultrahazardous should be
considered.
C. Driving SUVs as an Ultrahazardous Activity
With the rise of the automobile in the early twentieth century, com-
mon law courts in the United States rejected attempts to impose ultrahaz-
ardous strict liability on driving.360 As cars became more common and
powerful over the years, some courts recognized the limitations and poten-
tial unfairness of the negligence-only regime, but were concerned over
possible "confusion" and "chaotic" consequences of switching to strict
356. 844 P.2d 724, 731 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992).
357. Id. at 726.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 731.
360. See Steffen v. McNaughton, 124 N.W. 1016, 1017 (Wis. 1910) ("[W]e discover nothing in the
construction, operation, and use of the automobile requiring that it be placed in the category with the
locomotive, ferocious animals, dynamite, and other dangerous contrivances and agencies."); Jones v.
Hoge, 92 P. 433, 434 (Wash. 1907) ("We do not think that an automobile can be placed in the same
category as locomotives, gunpowder, dynamite, and similarly dangerous machines or agencies.");
McIntyre v. Omer, 166 Ind. 57, 62 (1906) ("There is nothing dangerous in the use of an automobile
when managed by an intelligent and prudent driver.").
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liability. 361 Accordingly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts noted that
while driving a car carried an "unavoidable risk of serious harm," it should
not be considered abnormally dangerous. The drafters used the "common
usage" factor to exempt cars from strict liability. 362 However, the drafters
added this intriguing caveat:
On the other hand, the operation of a tank or any other motor vehicle of
such size and weight as to be unusually difficult to control safely, or to
be likely to damage the ground over which it is driven, is not yet a usual
activity for many people, and therefore the operation of such a vehicle
may be abnormally dangerous. 363
Although, as discussed above, this comment misconceives the risk
posed by the "tank" (difficulty of control vs. consequences of loss of con-
trol), 364 this comment demonstrates that the door is open for applying ul-
trahazardous strict liability to SUVs. Even under the restrictions and
possibly misguided factors of the Restatement (Second), strict liability is
justified when a vehicle gets so large and heavy that it takes on the attrib-
utes of a "tank." Considering the military origins of vehicles such as the
Hummer, and the sheer size and weight of other "behemoth" SUVs like the
CTX, it is entirely possible that the "tanks" are already roaming the streets.
1. SUVs Under the Restatement (Second) Factors
As shown above, courts have shown a willingness to explicitly or im-
plicitly reject the approach of the Restatement (Second) to ultrahazardous
activities. However, even if SUVs were analyzed under the six factors
listed in the Restatement, a strong case exists for imposing strict liability.
a. Factors (a) and (b): The Existence of a High Degree of Risk of Some
Harm, and the Likelihood that the Harm that Results from it Will Be Great
These two factors can be analyzed together. As the court said in Koos,
the dangerousness of the activity is analyzed by assessing both the prob-
ability and the magnitude of the threatened harm.365 Essentially, then, the
361. See, e.g., Maloney v. Rath, 445 P.2d 513, 514-15 (Cal. 1968). There, in 1968, the California
Supreme Court recognized "the growing dissatisfaction with the law of negligence as an effective and
appropriate means for governing compensation for the increasingly serious harms caused by automo-
biles," and noted that "a court might be tempted" to switch to a strict liability regime. Id. Nonetheless,
the court declined to do so, absent clear direction from the state legislature. Id. at 515.
362. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. i (1977) ("[A]utomobiles have come into such
general use that their operation is a matter of common usage. This, notwithstanding the residue of
unavoidable risk of serious harm that may result even from their careful operation, is sufficient to
prevent their use from being regarded as an abnormally dangerous activity.").
363. Id. (emphasis added).
364. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
365. Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Or. 1982).
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analysis under these two factors involves an evaluation of the nature of the
risks posed by the activity. Part I of this Note detailed the risks posed to
others by SUVs, including statistics showing the carnage resulting when an
SUV slams into a car or runs down a pedestrian. 366 The magnitude of lethal
danger is high, and with the growing popularity of large SUVs such as
Hummers and the new CTX,36 7 the probability of such harm continues to
increase.
b. Factor (c): Inability to Eliminate the Risk by the Exercise of
Reasonable Care
One argument against imposing strict liability might be that the SUV
risks can be eliminated as long as the driver is non-negligent, i.e., as long
as the driver does not cause an accident. This argument fails for two rea-
sons. First, the magnitude of the SUV risk is such that the dangers exist
regardless of who is at fault. For instance, if a Honda Civic runs a red light
and is broadsided by a Ford Excursion, it does not matter if the Excursion's
driver had the green light and was going only twenty-five miles per hour.
The resulting chance of injury or death to the Civic occupants is many
times what it would have been had the SUV been another passenger car.
Second, the fact of modern driving is that accidents happen. In Larsen,
discussed in Part II of this Note, the crucial element of the court's reason
for holding an auto manufacturer liable for enhanced injuries was that acci-
dents are "clearly foreseeable" and "statistically inevitable. '368 Similarly,
the court in Siegler declared that it would have imposed strict liability on
the driver of the gasoline tanker even if the tanker had detached due to
"negligence of third parties" or defects in the road.369 The reason was noth-
ing more than the "extraordinary dangers deriving from [the] sheer quan-
tity, bulk and weight" of the tanker full of gas. 370 In short, the driver of that
Excursion could be the most careful, conscientious driver in America, and
the extraordinary risks posed by his choice of vehicle would remain undi-
minished.
366. See supra notes 73-126 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
368. Larsen v. Gen. Motors Corp, 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
369. Siegler v. Kulhman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1187 (Wash. 1972).
370. Id. at 1184.
[Vol 81:149
TANKS IN THE STREETS
c. Factor (d): The Extent to Which the Activity is not a Matter of
Common Usage
As discussed above, courts have both explicitly and implicitly ignored
the "common usage" factor.371 For instance, in Tutu Wells, the court im-
posed strict liability despite the fact that service stations are common-
place; 372 similarly, Siegler disregarded the common use of gasoline
tankers. 373 Other courts have circumvented the factor by defining a com-
mon activity in such a way that it is no longer commonplace. Thus,
Lothringer turned pest control into "professional fumigation," 374 and in
Koos, fire became "agricultural field burning. '375
Moreover, an activity of "common usage" becomes ultrahazardous
under the right circumstances. For instance, in Koos, the court distin-
guished between everyday backyard burning and agricultural field burn-
ing. 376 Both activities involved the same basic act of burning leaves and
brush, but the field burning created hazards "beyond the ordinary risks
associated with common uses of fire."' 37 7 Thus, strict liability for dangerous
activities is not limited just to activities entirely different from those nor-
mally carried on by members of the community; rather, an ordinary activ-
ity, carried out in an abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous manner, can
also justify the imposition of strict liability. The drafters of the Restatement
(Second) agreed: "[A]bnormal dangers arise from activities that are in
themselves unusual, or from unusual risks created by more usual activities
under particular circumstances. '378 Thus, driving a car may be an activity
of "common usage," but driving a "tank or any other motor vehicle of such
size and weight" is not.379
Driving a Hummer HI or an International CTX is thus not an activity
of "common usage." As discussed in Part I on this Note, these massive
SUVs create risks to passenger cars and pedestrians far above and beyond
the risks that are normally associated with other vehicles. Even though the
activity itself--driving-is not unusual, the driver's choice of vehicle turns
an everyday activity into one that creates "unusual risks." Thus, even if a
court were to follow the Restatement (Second)'s "common usage" factor-
371. See supra notes 307-09, 320-25, 332-33 and accompanying text.
372. In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litig., 846 F. Supp. 1243, 1269-70 (D.V.I. 1993).
373. Siegler, 502 P.2d at 1186-87; see supra notes 320-21 and accompanying text.
374. Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1948).
375. Koos v. Roth, 652 P.2d 1255, 1265 (Or. 1982).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f(1977).
379. Id. § 520 cmt. i.
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which many do not-large SUVs would not be excluded from ultrahazard-
ous strict liability on that ground.
d. Factor (e): Inappropriateness of the Activity to the Place Where It Is
Carried on
Courts like Koos reject factor (e) out of hand, recognizing that an ac-
tivity is not otherwise immune from strict liability because it is "appropri-
ate" in its place. 380 Nonetheless, it is worth considering that SUVs are
marketed to emphasize their off-road capabilities; in fact, those capabilities
are often raised in defense of SUVs. 38 1 The "appropriate" place for these
vehicles, then, would be somewhere where they could climb boulders or
scale mountains, rather than roam city streets and suburban parking lots. If
some of the characteristics that make SUVs so dangerous-height and
stiffness, for instance-are designed to provide ground clearance for obsta-
cles and enhance off-road toughness, then everyday driving on paved roads
is not entirely "appropriate."
e. Factor 09: The Extent to Which the Activity's Value to the Community
Is Outweighed by Its Dangerous Attributes
As discussed in Part II of this Note with regard to the risk-utility de-
sign defect test, SUVs have no value to the community. The "utility" of
SUVs consists of little more than a psychological benefit to their owners, a
benefit consisting of feelings of power, freedom, control over others, and
self-protection. Such utility, even if it had any value to the community,
would be overwhelmingly outweighed by the extraordinary dangers of
SUVs.
Thus, if determining whether SUVs are abnormally dangerous under
the Restatement (Second), all six factors would be fulfilled. This makes a
strong case for strict liability, especially because not all six are even
needed.382 In fact, courts have imposed strict liability where only three or
four factors are present, such as in Siegler (disregarding common usage,
appropriateness to location, and value to community), or Tutu Wells (ignor-
ing common usage and value to community). Thus, even if a court chose to
strictly follow the Restatement (Second), strict liability for SUVs is war-
ranted.
380. 652 P.2dat 1263.
381. See supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
382. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f(1977).
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2. SUVs Under Traditional Principles Of Ultrahazardous Strict Liability
As discussed above, many courts have chosen to eschew strict reliance
on the Restatement (Second) when imposing strict liability for ultrahazard-
ous activities. These courts rest their decisions on two broad themes: first, a
recognition of the extraordinary inherent risks of certain activities; and
second, an overarching concern of basic fairness to innocent victims who
are injured as a result of an extraordinarily risky activity that they had noth-
ing to do with. In light of these two principles, the case for imposing strict
liability for driving an SUV is even stronger than under the Restatement
(Second).
Part I of this Note outlined the inherent risks posed by SUVs, and
large SUVs in particular. In light of the extraordinary dangers created by
these vehicles, it is likely that courts that have found ultrahazardous risks in
activities such as pest control fumigation, trailer tankers on the highway,
crop dusting, leaky gas tanks, fireworks displays, and car exhaust, would
find such inherent risks in an activity as lethal to other drivers and pedestri-
ans as driving a large SUV.
One component of the fairness principle is that victims of the extraor-
dinarily risky activity have no relation to the activity other than being in-
jured by it, and cannot take steps to prevent their injuries. 383 Collision
partners of SUVs or pedestrians in an SUV's path have little ability to pre-
vent their injuries or control the situation. There are basically two options.
First, one could choose not to drive or walk near streets. This, of course,
would be an intolerable infringement upon individual autonomy and lib-
erty. The second option would be to buy one's own mega-SUV. Given that
many consumers choose SUVs because they are huge and menacing, these
buyers would no doubt want an even bigger one if everyone else began
driving SUVs. Then, drivers concerned with being "mowed down" 384 by
huge SUVs would have to get their own, and the cycle of escalating SUV
size and weight would continue with no end in sight. In effect, choosing the
second option would lead to an SUV "arms race." 385
Another component of the fairness rationale of ultrahazardous strict li-
ability contrasts the plaintiff s lack of relation to the activity or her inability
to prevent her injuries with the profit or benefit the defendant derives from
it.386 As discussed in Part II of this Note, an SUV driver benefits from his
383. See supra notes 338-41 and accompanying text.
384. Levin, Study Questions Safety, supra note 60.
385. White, Arms Race, supra note 49, at 333 (labeling the current trend in which drivers replace
their cars with SUVs, and then replace those vehicles with even bigger SUVs, a vehicular "arms race").
386. See supra notes 342-46 and accompanying text.
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choice of vehicle by enjoying the feelings of power, freedom, control over
others, and (illusory) self-protection provided by the characteristics of SUV
design. A plaintiff who is injured as a result of those dangerous design
characteristics enjoys none of this SUV "utility"; the benefit is purely per-
sonal to the driver of the SUV. In fact, there is even more justification for
holding this psychological benefit against an SUV driver than against de-
fendants who profit financially from their dangerous activity. At least those
defendants, by obtaining wealth, can indirectly benefit society by spending
it. A Hummer driver, on the other hand, cannot share his benefit; he alone
gets to enjoy the feeling of dominance and self-protection.
Professor Fletcher, discussing justifications for ultrahazardous strict
liability, provides an apt analogy by contrasting dog ownership to owner-
ship of a wild horse in the city. 387 Even though others in the community
keep pets, the owner of the wild horse creates risks to others far beyond
those created by dogs. Thus, "it seems fair to hold him liable for the results
of his aberrant indulgence." 388 SUVs are the wild horses in the city. As a
matter of basic fairness, so too should a Hummer driver pay for the conse-
quences of his "aberrant indulgence."
CONCLUSION
SUVs create risks to others far above and beyond the usual risks cre-
ated by driving. In collisions with other vehicles, the other drivers are many
times more likely to die. In collisions with pedestrians, an SUV will kill
where a car will injure.
The design features of SUVs that lead to such lethal risks foster no
utility or value of any consequence. Any marginal benefit provided by
these vehicles consists of nothing more than a psychological benefit to their
drivers, a feeling of power, control, freedom, and self-protection. This feel-
ing is purely personal to the drivers, and has no value to anyone else in
society.
This Note has discussed two possible legal options for dealing with
the dangers created by SUVs. The first, litigating SUV design features as a
product defect, has been attempted. Although it failed in De Veer, similar
cases have been settling, indicating that the legal approach is sound. How-
ever, there are drawbacks. A successful lawsuit might lead to design
changes in the future, but not the present. Millions of defective SUVs
would still roam the highways, in ever-deteriorating condition, with prices
387. Fletcher, Fairness, supra note 340, at 547-48.
388. Id. at 548.
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decreasing to the point at which a reckless eighteen-year-old could buy one
with money saved from a fast-food job. Successful suits could cost Ford
and General Motors a substantial amount of money, might make some law-
yers and plaintiffs rich, and could lead to safer future design choices. How-
ever, little would be done to ameliorate the clear and present dangers of
SUVs.
The ultrahazardous activity approach would have a more immediate
impact. A successful suit against an SUV driver, or the driver's insurance
company, would immediately change the way consumers choose their ve-
hicles. Insurance companies, instead of rewarding large SUVs for killing
rather than merely maiming others, would be forced to hike SUV premiums
considerably. Individual cases would sort out which SUVs are ultrahazard-
ous and which are not. The insurance premiums, however, would likely go
up across the board, creating a strong disincentive to anyone considering an
SUV purchase. In the face of dwindling demand, auto manufacturers would
significantly roll back SUV production. Meanwhile, used SUVs would sit
on the lots, rusting, no threat to anyone.

